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Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent
Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’
Violations of International Human
Rights Law
Gwynne Skinner ∗
Abstract
The doctrine of limited liability of shareholders often
prevents victims harmed by a corporation’s foreign subsidiary’s
violation of international human rights norms from obtaining a
remedy when that subsidiary operates in a country that has a weak
or ineffective judicial system. This is because victims are often
unable to obtain a remedy in these countries, and the doctrine
almost always prevents victims from seeking a remedy from the
parent corporation. Given this problem, in what situations should
parent corporations be liable for the tortious activities of their
foreign subsidiaries? This Article discusses the circumstances where
imposing liability on parent corporations is justified and provides a
specific statutory recommendation for such liability. The Article
outlines the three primary solutions various authors and
practitioners have advocated thus far to address the problem—the
enterprise liability approach, the due diligence approach, and the
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direct parental duty-of-care approach—and addresses the
limitations of each of these proposed solutions. The Article then
recommends a different, primarily statutory, approach: that
Congress or states (or both) should enact legislation disregarding
limited liability of parent corporations for claims of customary
international human rights violations and serious environmental
torts where a parent corporation takes a majority interest or creates
a subsidiary as part of unified economic enterprise that operates in
a “high-risk host country,” i.e., one that has a weak, ineffective, or
corrupt judicial system, and victims cannot obtain an adequate
judicial remedy for such harms in the host country. This proposed
solution moves away from the current notion that a parent
corporation should only be liable where it has some actual control
over the subsidiary, toward parent corporate liability where the
parent benefits financially from the subsidiary’s actions at the
expense of unconsenting, third parties—typically members of the
community where the subsidiary operates.
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I. Introduction
The doctrine of limited liability of shareholders, which
prevents shareholders of a corporation from being financially
liable to victims for the actions and debts of that corporation
beyond the level of their investment, 1 is deeply ingrained into the
law of the United States, 2 as well as many other countries. 3 After
1. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1039 (1991)
A fundamental principle of corporate law is that shareholders in a
corporation are not liable for the obligations of the enterprise beyond
the capital that they contribute in exchange for their shares. A
corollary of this principle is that the corporation is an entity separate
from its shareholders, directors, or officers. Such limited liability was
not always the rule in American law, but it has been accepted in most
American jurisdictions since the mid-nineteenth century.
2. See William Douglas & Carol Shanks, Insulation from Liability
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193–94 (1929) (“Limited
liability is now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained in our
economic and legal systems. The social and economic order is arranged
accordingly. Our philosophy accepts it.”); see also Meredith Dearborn, Enterprise
Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CAL. L.
REV. 195, 199 (2009) (“This governing principle of the parent-subsidiary
relationship has influenced corporate law throughout the fifty states, and most
practitioners, judges, and commentators take it for granted.”).
3. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 198 (providing examples of international
companies arranged to protect shareholders via limited liability); Phillip I.
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 595–96
(1986) [hereinafter Blumberg, Limited Liability] (describing how limited
liability spread throughout continental Europe in the early 1800s).
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states began allowing corporations to own shares of other
corporations in the 1880s, the doctrine of limited liability began
applying to parent corporations, as shareholders, for acts of their
subsidiaries. 4 Thus, the doctrine limits liability of corporate
parents as well as individual shareholders. 5 Of course, in limited
situations where a parent is shown to control the subsidiary to
the extent that the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent
and the parent uses the subsidiary for some wrongful purpose,
the protection of limited liability can be removed—an act referred
to as “piercing the corporate veil.” 6 Where a plaintiff does not
4. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 604
Over the historical period in which these dramatic changes occurred,
the form of the business firm has changed remarkably. Limited
liability triumphed at a time when corporations were simple, when
one corporation could not acquire and own the shares of another.
Limited liability meant protection for the ultimate investor. Long
after corporations were firmly established, corporations generally
were first granted the power to acquire and own shares of other
corporations. Major business rapidly changed form with the
emergence of complex multi-tiered corporate structures that included
a parent corporation and numerous affiliated corporations collectively
conducting the business of the group.
5. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61–64 (1998)
(acknowledging that shareholder protection applies to parents of subsidiaries);
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361–62 (1944) (“Normally the corporation is
an insulator from liability on claims of creditors. The fact that incorporation was
desired in order to obtain limited liability does not defeat that purpose. Limited
liability is the rule, not the exception . . . .” (citations omitted)); Burnet v. Clark,
287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (“A corporation and its stockholders are generally to be
treated as separate entities . . . .”); see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life
Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998)
Parents of wholly owned subsidiaries necessarily control, direct, and
supervise the subsidiaries to some extent, but unless there is a basis
for piercing the corporate veil and thus attributing the subsidiaries’
torts to the parent, the parent is not liable for those torts, and cannot
be served under the tort provision of the long-arm statute.
(citations omitted); Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 604 (“Limited
liability no longer meant protection for the ultimate investor alone. It also
meant protection for the parent corporation against liability for the obligations
of its subsidiaries, even if they were conducting essential parts of a single,
unitary business.”).
6. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (noting the “equally fundamental
principle of corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as
well as generally, that the corporate veil may be pierced . . . when, inter alia, the
corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful
purposes . . . on the shareholder’s behalf”); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v.
Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1996)
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succeed in piercing the veil, or cannot otherwise establish that
the parent is directly liable to third persons harmed through the
parent’s own actions or through the use of the subsidiary as an
agent to carry out its own policies or decisions, 7 the principle is
that a parent corporation will not be held liable to victims for the
acts of its subsidiary, no matter how egregious. 8
With regard to business-related human rights and
environmental abuses, such limits on parent liability for a
subsidiary’s illegal and harmful actions are not problematic as
long as victims can identify the subsidiary causing the harm and
can obtain a remedy in the country where the subsidiary is
located and operates (host country). 9 The problem lies where
In making this determination [to pierce the corporate veil], courts
look to a variety of factors, including the intermingling of corporate
and personal funds, undercapitalization of the corporation, failure to
observe corporate formalities . . . , failure to pay dividends, . . . and
the inactivity of other officers and directors.
(citations omitted); see also Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979)
(explaining that alter-ego liability exists when the corporation is used “to
achieve fraud, or when the corporation has been so dominated by an individual
or another corporation (usually a parent corporation), and its separate identity
so disregarded, that it primarily transacted the dominator’s business rather
than its own”).
7. See infra Part VI.C.3 (describing limitations in the duty-of-care
approach to tort liability).
8. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540
(7th Cir. 1998) (“[U]nless there is a basis for piercing the corporate veil and thus
attributing the subsidiaries’ torts to the parent, the parent is not liable for those
torts . . . .”). It is possible, however, that the parent could be liable under an
agency theory of liability. Under agency theory, a principal is liable for the acts
of its agent: “Under the law of both New York and Georgia, principals may be
held liable for torts committed by their agents when such agents act within the
scope of their agency.” Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir. 2012)
(establishing that the agency relationship differs from state to state); see also
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding Exxon
Mobil could be liable under an agency theory, but rejecting other theories of
liability); Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1246–47 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (refusing to pierce the veil, but holding that the case could proceed
under agency law). The case eventually went to trial, and the jury ultimately
rejected all claims against the company, with the Ninth Circuit affirming the
trial court’s decisions on a variety of matters. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621
F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that because the statute mentions
individuals it did not cover corporations), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1968 (2012)).
9. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (describing how,
typically, victims are not able to seek a remedy for a subsidiary’s conduct in the
United States due to lack of personal jurisdiction over the separate subsidiary).
Of course, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant to hear
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victims cannot do so. 10 Unfortunately, victims of tortious conduct
by companies in countries with ineffectual or corrupt government
and judicial systems often face many obstacles in obtaining a
remedy in the country where the companies operate. 11
Sometimes the companies engaging in the alleged tortious
conduct are the wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries of
corporations of more developed countries, including U.S.
corporations. 12 Under current U.S. law, even where the
subsidiary engages in the most serious type of tortious conduct
and the victims are unable to obtain a remedy in the host
country, there is little opportunity to circumvent limited liability
and obtain redress from the U.S. parent, even though the parent
gains immense benefits from having a subsidiary operate in a
foreign nation. 13
the case. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 629 (1990) (noting that
a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant to hear the case);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978) (same).
10. See infra Part III (detailing how victims of violations of human rights
norms have been unable to obtain remedies in the host countries).
11. See infra Part III (same).
12. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 99 (listing ATS cases where most of the
parent corporations are U.S. corporations).
13. For a discussion of such benefits, see infra Part IV.A. Moreover,
bringing a claim in the United States against the subsidiary (or, for that matter,
a non-U.S. parent corporation with substantial and continuous business activity
in the United States)—such as a transitory tort claim or a claim for violation of
customary law under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) (28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012))—is
typically not possible due to lack of personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary (or
the foreign parent). See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)
(analyzing general personal jurisdiction). In Bauman, the Supreme Court
essentially held that courts cannot assert general personal jurisdiction over a
corporation consistent with due process when it is not headquartered or
incorporated within its jurisdiction, even if the corporation does significant
business there directly or through a subsidiary. See id. at 761 (explaining the
limits of general personal jurisdiction). The Court rejected the argument that
the economic activities of a parent’s wholly-owned subsidiary could be attributed
to the parent company for purposes of general personal jurisdiction. See id. at
761–62 (considering International Shoe and Goodyear). Moreover, the Court
reaffirmed that general personal jurisdiction can only be asserted in a country
or state where the corporation is essentially “at home,” but opined that in
determining a corporation’s home, a court must appraise a corporation’s
activities in their entirety, looking both nation- and worldwide, and noting that
a corporation cannot be at home in several locations. See id. at 762 n.20 (“A
corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all
of them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing business’ tests
framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.”). The Court
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In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court erected a new barrier in
human-rights litigation brought under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) 14 in 2013. In Kiobel v. Dutch Royal Shell, 15 the Court held,
for the first time in decades of ATS litigation, that the
presumption against a statute’s extraterritorial application 16
(created in the absence of Congress stating that the statute
applies extraterritorially) applies to claims of customary
international law violations brought under the ATS. 17 Thus, even
if the problem of limited liability is addressed, such as through
piercing the corporate veil, victims of extraterritorial human
rights violations still are unlikely to be able to hold the parent
corporation accountable for a remedy in U.S. courts. Therefore,
for victims to be able to seek a remedy in U.S. courts against a
parent corporation for harms created by a subsidiary’s actions,
both limited liability and the obstacle created by Kiobel will need
to be addressed. 18 The solution advocated by this Article does so.
previously held that a court may assert general jurisdiction over corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the state are
so “continuous and systematic” as to render them essentially at home in the
forum state. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2857 (2011) (explaining that the party must first attempt to pierce the
corporate veil). Thus, Bauman greatly limits the ability of victims of human
rights abuses abroad to bring cases against businesses that, although they may
not be headquartered or have their principal places of business in the United
States, engage in significant and continuous activity in the United States, as
had been the practice for years.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
15. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
16. The presumption against extraterritoriality is the “longstanding
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.’” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). In applying this principle,
courts “assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.” Id.
17. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (denying claims under the ATS).
18. Non-ATS claims, such as garden-variety tort claims under state law,
are not limited by Kiobel, but courts analyzing these claims will probably be
influenced by Kiobel and adopt a similar approach, or more likely, dismiss the
claims under forum non conveniens grounds, as often occurs in such cases. In
fact, forum non conveniens has already been a significant barrier to victims in
cases brought under state tort law for acts occurring abroad. See Gwynne L.
Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Corporate
Accountability for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by
Transnational Corporations in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
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As the above indicates, in many situations of tortious conduct
by a corporate subsidiary, victims are left in a quandary. Even
though the parent corporations, as shareholders, receive great
economic and tax benefits from their foreign subsidiaries’
activities, 19 they are able externalize the risks of their operations
through their subsidiaries—such as environmental risks and
violations of international human rights law—and avoid liability,
leaving victims with no remedy. 20
L. REV. 158, 203–13 (2014) (explaining that when courts apply forum non
conveniens in cases brought against transnational businesses, they “dismiss the
cases expecting that they will be filed in the host countries where the violations
or harm occurred”); see also Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International
Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 9, 17–20 (2013) (noting that forum non conveniens is the “initial
battle-ground in state court human rights cases”); Geoffrey P. Miller, In Search
of the Most Adequate Forum: State Court Personal Jurisdiction, 2 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 34–35 (2014) (highlighting that courts are not likely to utilize
forum non conveniens when a case involves an American citizen against a
foreign defendant). For additional cases where state courts have declined
jurisdiction over cases involving foreign plaintiffs where the court found that an
alternative forum was available, see generally Martin J. McMahon, Forum Non
Conveniens Doctrine in State Court as Affected by Availability of Alternative
Forum, 57 A.L.R. 4th 973 § 11[b]. For those cases where state courts declined
jurisdiction even where the court also found that an alternative forum was
unavailable, see generally id. § 12[b]. The doctrine of forum non conveniens
allows courts to dismiss a case, even where it can assert jurisdiction, on the
basis that another jurisdiction is ostensibly more “convenient” for the parties
and witnesses. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (“The
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general venue statute.”).
19. See Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by
Multinational Companies on Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 785, 816–
17 (2011) (describing advantages of low labor costs and lenient regulatory
regimes); Christopher H. Hanna, Corporate Tax Reform: Listening to Corporate
America, 35 J. CORP. L. 283, 298–99 (2009) (describing significant tax
advantages of foreign subsidiaries, such as the tax advantages of deferral of
income earned by a foreign subsidiary); Christopher H. Hanna, The Real Value
of Tax Deferral, 61 FLA. L. REV. 203, 231–33 (2009) [hereinafter Hanna, Real
Value] (describing additional tax-related benefits of foreign subsidiaries, such as
advantageous accounting rules); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Worse Than Exemption,
59 EMORY L.J. 79, 84–85 (2009) (describing how foreign subsidiaries provide
U.S. resident corporations with “overly generous tax benefits” and providing
examples); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 538
(2008) (describing how foreign subsidiaries provide advantages over domestic
competitors in the United States).
20. Several scholars have written about how limited liability of parent
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To be sure, great economic benefit inures to host countries
through the economic activity of subsidiaries created or
purchased by U.S. companies (within the category of investment
referred to as foreign direct investment). 21 Such investment often
results in increased wages, import of technology, developments
and investment in infrastructure, and even a decrease in
poverty. 22 However, where those subsidiaries cause or are
corporations externalizes risks and creates barriers for victims of transnational
torts to access judicial remedies. See, e.g., Jodie A. Kirshner, Why is the U.S.
Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?:
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 259, 264 (2012) (describing how multinational companies use and abuse the
corporate form to protect them from liability); Kiarie Mwaura, Internalization of
Costs to Corporate Groups: Part-Whole Relationships, Human Rights Norms and
the Futility of the Corporate Veil, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 85, 88–89, 96, 101–05
(2012) (noting how transnational corporations use the separation between
parent corporations and subsidiaries to limit the liability of parent corporations
for illegal actions of subsidiaries); Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational
Corporations Accountable? Achilles’ Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227, 243 (2011) (discussing corporations’ attempts to
purposefully limit liability of parent corporations); Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph,
How Can the United States Correct Multi-National Corporations’ Environmental
Abuses Committed in the Name of Trade?, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 53–
54 (2004) (noting that “a plaintiff injured by the subsidiary’s actions will have a
difficult time” holding the parent corporation liable in U.S. courts); John M.
Brown, Parent Corporation’s Liability Under CERCLA Section 107 for the
Environmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries, 31 TULSA L.J. 819, 823 (1996)
(noting that under corporate law, parent corporations are not generally liable
for subsidiaries’ violations).
21. See,
e.g.,
Foreign
Direct
Investment,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
The investing company may make its overseas investment in a
number of ways—either by setting up a subsidiary or associate
company in the foreign country, by acquiring shares of an overseas
company, or through a merger or joint venture. The accepted
threshold for a foreign direct investment relationship, as defined by
the OECD, is 10%. That is, the foreign investor must own at least
10% or more of the voting stock or ordinary shares of the investee
company.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See David Shea Bettwy, Human Rights and Wrongs of Foreign Direct
Investment: Addressing the Need for an Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 239, 243, 249–51 (2012) (noting that FDI produces
socio-economic benefits, environmental benefits, and human rights benefits);
Antoine Bouët, Trade and Investment in Latin America and Asia: Perspectives
from Further Integration, 34 J. POL’Y MODELLING 193, 204 (2012) (“The new FDI
modeling framework reveals that Latin American countries benefit from an
increase in FDI inflows. Except for Central America, all regions in Latin
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America increase GDP when foreign investment is introduced in the model, and
even more so when the FTA includes BITs.”); Guillermo Emiliano Del Toro,
Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico and the 1994 Crisis: A Legal Perspective, 20
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 86–87 (1997)
FDI brings the following benefits to host countries: (1) it provides a
source of foreign finance after the breakdown of commercial bank
lending; (2) it contributes to development, transferring technology
and know-how, as well as promoting a more efficient share of risk
than other means of attracting capital; (3) the creation of jobs; (4) the
creation of welfare; (5) it substitutes for financial aid, loans, and
portfolio investment as a means of attracting capital and finally
(6) the creation of growth.
Matthias Görgen, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Land in Developing
Countries 9, 21 (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit,
Division 45–Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) (Dec. 2009) (suggesting that FDI
in land can enhance economic development and reduce poverty by initiating
growth in the local economy, increasing productivity on agricultural land,
improving market access for farmers in rural areas, and improving
infrastructure by building roads or investing in transportation and
communication); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional
Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1317–19 (2008) (noting that FDI may improve
local human rights practices because host countries cater to investors that value
country conditions that promote human rights because investors value stability,
transparency, and market economies that encourage the free movement of goods
and people); Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment
Treaties: A Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 131, 139 (2013) (stating that benefits of
FDI for a capital-importing country include access to new technologies,
opportunities for technology transfer, expanded tax base, reduced dependence
on foreign aid, access to new sources of financing for development, and support
for local business suppliers); ORGANISATION FOR COOPERATION & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT:
MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS 5 (2001), http://www.oecd.org/
investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf (“The overall benefits of FDI
for developing country economies are well documented. . . .”); Álvaro Pereira,
Legal Stability Contracts in Colombia: An Appropriate Incentive for
Investments? Historical Causes and Impact Analysis of Law 963 of 2005, 12
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 237, 242–44 (2013) (stating that FDI is “the most
effective engine for development” because it is a good source of financial
resources, new jobs, and technologies); Akinori Tomohara & Sadayuki Takii,
Does Globalization Benefit Developing Countries? Effects of FDI on Local Wages,
33 J. POL’Y MODELLING 511, 516, 520 (2011) (finding that foreign direct
investment benefits workers employed by local establishments in a host
developing country, by creating wages above the market-based wage that would
otherwise prevail); Eric Burt, Note, Developing Countries and the Framework
for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization,
12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1015, 1021 (1997) (stating that host countries may
benefit from FDI through the injection of capital, the introduction, transfer, or
“spillover” of technology, the introduction of advanced management skills,
increased host country employment, increased competition in the host country
market, and increased foreign exchange earnings); Ann-Christin Gerlach &

1780

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015)

involved in even the most egregious torts, the harm is absorbed
by vulnerable populations. 23 Given this juxtaposition, there is
increasing recognition that it is unfair that corporations receive
tax and other benefits from their use of wholly-owned
subsidiaries while being able to avoid liability when those
wholly-owned subsidiaries engage in human rights violations,
regardless of the fault of the parent company. 24
Pascal Liu, Resource-seeking Foreign Direct Investment in African Agriculture: A
Review of Country Case Studies 4 (FAO Commodity & Trade Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 31, 2010), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/
PUBLICATIONS/Comm_Working_Papers/EST-WP31.pdf (stating that benefits
of FDI for host countries can be economic, such as employment creation, higher
productivity, improved access to finance and markets for smallholders,
technology transfer, and enforcement of production standards); Michael Klein,
et al., Foreign Direct Investment and Poverty Reduction (World Bank Policy
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
2613,
2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=632682 (suggesting that
“FDI is a key ingredient for successful economic growth in developing countries”
and offering an index of studies that have measured the effects of FDI on
poverty reduction).
23. See Mwaura, supra note 20, at 85–86 (explaining how victims of human
rights abuses often absorb the costs of those abuses).
24. See, e.g., id. at 88–89, 96, 101–05 (discussing the benefits corporations
gain from human rights abuses committed by subsidiary companies); Dearborn,
supra note 2, at 205–07, 211–12 (noting the large benefits corporations gain
from subsidiaries’ risky conduct while only bearing some of the costs); Ristroph,
supra note 20, at 53–54 (noting that corporations externalize the costs of doing
business while enjoying the benefits); David L. Cohen, Theories of the
Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and
Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and
Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427,
438–44 (1998) (discussing the benefits corporations receive as a result of limited
liability); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and
Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1, 29–39 (1994) [hereinafter Thompson, Unpacking] (discussing
corporations’ externalization of costs to reap benefits from subsidiaries’
potentially abusive conduct); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims,
and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1584–87, 1613–23, 1637–40 (1991)
(same); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1883, 1892–94, 1916–19 (1991)
(arguing that courts should “consider the structure of particular corporate
defendants in determining the extent of their tort liability” so individual
shareholders are more protected from judgment damages than large
corporations, which are better able to sustain the cost); Mark J. Roe, Corporate
Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 39–56 (1986) (examining the
practice of externalizing the risks of a subsidiary to allow the parent corporation
to avoid liability as a result of actions taken by subsidiary); Blumberg, Limited
Liability, supra note 3, at 576 (noting that limited liability that insulates parent
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Due to this unfairness, some scholars have argued for
unlimited liability of shareholders in all situations, or at least of
corporate parents. 25 Others have advocated, quite persuasively,
for an “enterprise theory” of liability where the parent should be
liable for a subsidiary’s actions when it functionally controls that
subsidiary. 26 More recently, at least one advocate has argued for
enterprise liability based solely on economic control where a
subsidiary benefits the parent company as part of a unified
economic scheme or business. 27 This is a concept that the United
corporations from liability for claims against a subsidiary “raises serious
problems because it enables the enterprise to externalize its costs”); Christopher
D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct,
90 YALE L.J. 1, 70–76 (1980) (noting that corporations will externalize the risks
of their actions by creating subsidiaries in order to avoid liability of actions
taken by subsidiaries).
25. See infra Part IV (advocating for corporate liability, not individual
liability); see also, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 1883, 1892–
94, 1916–19 (arguing that courts should “consider the structure of particular
corporate defendants in determining the extent of their tort liability” so
individual shareholders are more protected from judgment damages than large
corporations, which are better able to sustain the cost).
26. See, e.g., Thompson, Unpacking, supra note 24, at 12–17 (considering
the theory of enterprise liability and some justifications for its use); Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 24, at 1916–19 (discussing enterprise liability theory
in light of arguments on whether limited liability or unlimited liability is the
best regime for corporations); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an
Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 298 (1990)
[hereinafter Blumberg, Corporate Entity] (noting enterprise theory is emerging
in areas of law dealing with corporate governance); Stone, supra note 24, at 1
(analyzing enterprise liability theory and noting that in some cases the theory is
the best option while in others the theory would need to be reinforced by other
techniques); Howard Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U.
COLO. L. REV. 153, 157 (1976) (discussing the theory of enterprise liability for
torts and suggesting that the logic of tort liability is moving toward enterprise
liability). This theory was also advocated in litigation involving Unocal. See
infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing procedural barriers for
victims harmed by U.S. corporations’ subsidiaries’ actions in areas such as
human rights and the environment). For a more complete discussion of the
enterprise law, especially in comparison to entity law, see generally Phillip
Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Liability Principles In
Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV.
295 (1996) [hereinafter Blumberg, Increasing Recognition].
27. Dearborn, supra note 2, at 196, 252 (noting that enterprise liability
theory has historically only applied where the parent behaviorally controls the
subsidiary, and proposing a new test that would allow enterprise liability for
human rights violations when the parent has economic control over the
subsidiary).
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Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (U.N.
Guiding Principles) appear to endorse. 28 This is a viable
approach, but as discussed in this Article, the functional-control
enterprise theory does not go far enough; the economic-control
enterprise theory goes too far.
Still, others have recently argued for a slightly different
approach that I will term the “due diligence approach”: that there
should be a presumption of liability on the part of a parent
corporation for extraterritorial acts of its wholly-owned
subsidiary, but that the parent can overcome the presumption by
showing that it had engaged in “due diligence” efforts to ensure
that its subsidiary operated consistently with human rights and
environmental standards and was otherwise unaware of the
abuses. 29 At least one country, France, has pending legislation
that takes a similar approach. 30
28. See John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/L.17/31 (June 16, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding
Principles] (summarizing the special representative’s work from 2005 to 2011
regarding the increased social awareness of businesses’ impact on human
rights). For additional guidance on the application of the U.N. Guiding
Principles to corporations, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive
Guide, U.N. Doc. HR/Pub/12/02 (June 2012) (explaining further the U.N.
Guiding Principles and helping to interpret their original meaning and intent).
See generally BUS. & HUM. RIGHTS RESOURCE CTR., http://www.businesshumanrights.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing information on
companies’ human rights policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also infra Part V (detailing how the U.N. Guiding Principles appear
to endorse enterprise liability based on economic control where the subsidiary
benefits the parent company).
29. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability
Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 455, 457 (2008)
(discussing transnational businesses’ duty to engage in human rights pursuant
to the U.N. Guiding Principles and discussing how businesses can use their due
diligence as a defense to human rights claims under the ATS); see also Yihe
Yang, Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: The Practical
Implications from Kiobel, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 207–08 (2013) (advocating
that corporations should incorporate “due diligence” mechanisms for human
rights, and discussing how corporations might be able to use due diligence as a
defense).
30. Proposition de loi 1524 du 6 novembre 2013 relative au devoir de
vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Bill Number
1524, relating to the due diligence of parent and shareholder companies],
Enregistré à la Présidence de l’Assemblée Nationale de France, Nov. 6, 2013,
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion1524.asp; see
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This approach is also viable and would be a step in the right
direction. However, unlike the economic-control enterprise
theory, it does not resolve the main problem of inequality and
unfairness created by the great financial and tax benefits inuring
to the parent at the expense of harm absorbed by third parties,
nearly all of whom are likely to be non-consenting parties. 31
Additionally, neither of the above approaches takes into
account the additional barrier Kiobel created in 2013 for claims of
extraterritorial violations of human rights norms brought under
the Alien Tort Statute. 32
Some have also argued for finding pathways to bringing suits
directly against parent corporations for negligence due to some
role the parent had in the harm, or simply for creating or
purchasing a subsidiary engaging in an industry that is at high
risk for human rights abuses in a country that the parent knew
or should have known would not provide a remedy. 33 Although
such a tort claim also presents a possible way forward, there are
also Bill Number 1524, relating to the duty and vigilance of parent and
subcontracting companies, Registered by the President of the National
Assembly
of
France,
Nov.
6,
2013,
available
at
http://www.accessjustice.eu/map/proposition-loi-n-1524-devoir-de-vigilanceeng.pdf (English version of the bill); Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence:
Developments in Europe, CORE, http://corporate-responsibility.org/mandatoryhuman-rights-due-diligence-developments-in-europe/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
(noting that on March 31, 2015, the French National Assembly endorsed an
amended version of the bill, which will go to the French Senate in late 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. I make this distinction because in limited liability of parent
corporations for subsidiaries’ contract breaches, the contracting parties
knowingly assume the risk and have the opportunity to ensure that the
subsidiary can either satisfy the contract, or, in the case of lending money, can
ask for collateral or another entity to assume the risk if the subsidiary cannot
pay. Most tort victims are not consenting. There might be some situations where
a community does engage in a process of consenting to business activity in their
community while knowing the risks, but whether all such victims knowingly
accepted the risk would be a difficult proposition to confirm given various
cultural dynamics, such as gender discrimination. In addition, such populations
may not likely to have adequate legal counsel when giving consent or fully
appreciate the risks inherent in the activities.
32. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013)
(limiting the application of the ATS through the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and making it more difficult for noncitizens to bring claims
in federal courts).
33. See infra Part VI.C.2 (enumerating a more expansive tort-based
corporate parental duty-of-care approach).
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potential problems with such a tort-based approach, such as
whether or not a court will recognize that a duty is created in
such situations, especially given the policies behind limited
liability, and whether the corporation has violated a standard of
care. 34
This Article outlines the circumstances and situations where
imposing liability on parent corporations is justified in order to
provide victims a remedy for the harm caused by a foreign
subsidiary’s violations of international human rights law or gross
environmental torts, 35 and provides a specific statutory
recommendation regarding such liability. The Article proceeds as
follows. In Part II, the Article briefly discusses the history of
limited liability in the United States. 36 It describes how limited
liability continued without change when corporations began
owning shares in other corporations, even in the area of tort
liability. 37 It also notes how limited liability for corporate parents
has continued unabated even in the face of globalization and an
explosion of transnational business, along with all the complexity
caused by such changes, and even as victims of businesses’
human rights abuses are left without a remedy. 38 This section
also discusses why “piercing the corporate veil” is not a sufficient
doctrine in addressing harm caused by foreign subsidiaries.
In Part III, the Article describes how host countries often do
not provide victims a remedy due to corruption and ineffectual
legal and judicial systems. 39 In light of this, it describes how
limited liability has resulted in victims being left remediless. 40 In
34. See infra Part VI.C.3 (outlining the limitations of the tort-based
corporate parental duty-of-care approach).
35. The Article focuses primarily on remedies. Thus, the scope of this
Article is limited to solutions for overcoming limited liability of a parent
corporation in order to provide a remedy to victims. The scope of this Article
does not include exploring the best ways to prevent abuses from occurring in the
first place.
36. See infra Part II.A (explaining the historical origins of limited liability
in the United States and state influence over the corporate form).
37. See infra Part II.B (describing the origins of limited liability).
38. See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text (listing sources that
discuss the idea of limited liability continuing despite the advent of
globalization and international businesses).
39. See infra Part III (discussing the difficulties faced by victims in states
that do not have ideal regulatory or judicial systems).
40. See infra Part III (same).
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Part IV, the Article provides a normative argument as to why
parents of subsidiaries should be liable for their subsidiaries’
torts, especially those that violate human rights norms or involve
large environmental torts, noting the host of benefits that
parents receive from having part of their business enterprise be
conducted by a foreign subsidiary. 41
In Part V, the Article reviews how the United Nations
approaches transnational businesses’ obligations with respect to
remedying victims of human rights violations. 42 These include
both that business enterprises engage in human rights due
diligence and that countries ensure remedies for human rights
violations by subsidiaries of parent corporations (business
enterprises) over which they have legal jurisdiction. 43
In Part VI, the Article outlines solutions various authors and
practitioners have advocated thus far to address the problem,
primarily through three approaches—the enterprise liability
approach, the due diligence approach, and the direct parental
duty-of-care approach. 44 This part also addresses the limitations
of each of these solutions. 45 This section briefly addresses what is
taking place in France and Switzerland regarding holding parent
corporations liable for acts of their subsidiaries. 46
In Part VII, the Article recommends a different approach. It
argues that, in claims involving customary international human
rights violations (such as those brought under the ATS) and
serious environmental torts, limited liability of parent
corporations for should be disregarded where that parent takes a
majority interest in or creates a subsidiary as part of unified
economic enterprise 47 that operates in a “high-risk host country,”
41. See infra Part IV (arguing for parental liability for a subsidiary’s torts).
42. See infra Part V (explaining the role of the U.N. Guiding Principles,
which require parent corporations to remedy human rights harms caused by
their foreign subsidiaries).
43. See infra Part V (same).
44. See infra Part VI (discussing proposed solutions).
45. Infra Part VI.
46. See infra Part VI.B.1 (showing how France and Switzerland are moving
towards creating parental liability under a due diligence approach).
47. By this, I mean the business of the subsidiary the parent purchases or
creates is done to further the business of the parent as part of an integrated
business enterprise, rather than simply a purchase of stock as part of an
investment portfolio where the subsidiary’s business is unrelated to the parent’s
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i.e., one that has a weak, ineffective, or corrupt judicial system, 48
and (a) victims cannot obtain an adequate judicial remedy in the
country due to such corruption, lack of a cause of action, or other
judicial- or law-related reasons; 49 (b) victims cannot determine
what entity is responsible, and thus what entity to hold
accountable, given the enterprises’ complex corporate structure;
or (c) a subsidiary is underfunded and thus cannot pay any
damages resulting from the violations. This proposed solution
moves away from the current notion that a parent corporation
should only be liable where it has some actual control over a
subsidiary, toward parent corporate liability where the parent
benefits financially from the subsidiary’s actions at the expense of
unconsenting, third parties—typically members of the community
where the subsidiary operates.
Ideally, the creation of such parent liability should be done
through a statutory enactment. The underlying claims would
continue to be claims for violations of customary international
law under the ATS, state torts whose facts rise to the level of
violations of customary international law, or serious
environmental torts. A statutory enactment would overcome the
barrier created by Kiobel, given that through such legislation,
Congress, or a state legislature would be providing for a cause of
action even where the action took place abroad, and thus, there
would be no presumption against extraterritoriality. In the
alternative, courts could incorporate this approach in “piercing
the corporate veil” analyses, as well as when considering
enterprise liability and the tort-based parental duty of care. 50 For
public policy reasons, I advocate for this approach only with
regard to corporate shareholders, and not individual
shareholders.
business.
48. Whether or not a country is a “high risk” country would be a question of
fact.
49. This portion of the test has much in common with how one defeats a
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, as well as
exhaustion of remedies in the host country. The similarities are not intentional,
but reflect similar notions of fairness when considering whether victims should
be able to seek a remedy in a court outside of the host country, i.e., the country
where the harm occurred.
50. See infra Part VI.A (describing enterprise liability).
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Part VII concludes with a description of precedent wherein
Congress has overcome limited liability through statutory
enactments, and why comity and foreign policy concerns 51 should
not prohibit this approach. 52
II. An Overview of Limited Liability
A. History of Corporations
The history of limited liability of shareholders, including as it
applies to parent corporations, has received significant scholarly
attention; there is a plethora of material discussing its genesis
and purpose. 53 I do not need to reiterate all that history here. But
a few points are important to highlight for the topic of this
Article. First, it is important to remember that corporate entities
exist with the permission of the individual U.S. state in which
they are incorporated; 54 they do not exist as a matter of right. 55
51. For example, the Supreme Court expressed concerns about whether
U.S. courts can adjudicate cases involving extraterritorial acts of businesses
consistent with foreign policy and notions of comity in Kiobel. See Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (noting possible serious
foreign policy consequences); id. at 1671 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that
adjudicating a claim must be consistent with those “notions of comity that lead
each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach
of its own laws and their enforcement”); id. at 1669 (noting that comity concerns
led the Court to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality).
52. See infra Parts VII.B–D (discussing precedent and addressing comity
concerns).
53. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 2, at 193–94 (“Limited liability is
now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained in our economic and legal
systems. The social and economic order is arranged accordingly. Our philosophy
accepts it.”); Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 577–611 (detailing
the history of limited liability in the Anglo-American context); see also
Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 297 (“Much more recently,
the centuries-old view of the corporation as a separate legal personality was
reinforced by the adoption, after major political struggles, of the separate
doctrine of limited liability of shareholders for corporate debts.”).
54. See Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 26, at 292 (explaining that
corporations are purely legal creations); Dearborn, supra note 2, at 203 (stating
that corporations owe their existence to actions of state legislatures and state
action); see also Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979,
981 (1970) (arguing that the major facets of the corporate form remain the same
as they did during the early history of the United States).
55. See Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 26, at 292–94 (“A
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After our country’s founding, state legislatures would approve
each business’s right to exist as a corporation—and the benefits
that came with it—on a case-by-case basis. 56 Public corporations
were expected to achieve some sort of public purpose or promote
the public good. 57
In the mid-1800s the case-by-case approach began to
change. 58 There were so many businesses that wanted to become
corporations that states began to enact statutes that allowed
businesses to form corporations on a more routine basis, as long
as they filed their articles of incorporations with the states. 59
Public corporations—those for which shares are generally
available to the public 60—were still required to have a public
purpose. 61 Private corporations—those for which shares are
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law.”).
56. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 587 (noting that once
the United States was founded, it broke from the traditional English rule and
the incorporating power was moved to the thirteen states); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886–1936, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 27, 28 (1936) (describing the historical roots of modern business
corporation law and noting that incorporation, though sought on a case-by-case
basis, was nearly always granted).
57. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 587 (citing examples
of early American corporations with a public purpose, including bridges, canals,
turnpikes, and financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies).
58. See id. at 588, 590 (stating that one cause of such change was the
deterioration of relations with England due, in part, to an increase in
manufacturing corporations prior to the War of 1812, “[as] American readiness
to depend on European manufactured goods disappeared, and manufacturing
became an increasingly important political weapon”).
59. See id. at 591, 593 (discussing how incorporation was granted freely
within the original U.S. states); Dodd, supra note 56, at 28 (“Despite the fact
that the privilege was available only by obtaining a special act of incorporation
in each individual case, it was granted in many, perhaps in nearly all, of the
instances in which it was energetically sought.”).
60. See Public Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “public corporation” as one whose activities are available to and
benefit the public).
61. See Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations
to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23, 46–48 (2002) (noting the debate around the early
corporate form, and whether or not corporations were considered democratic
entities); Thomas P. Byrne, False Profits: Reviving the Corporation’s Public
Purpose, 57 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 25, 31 (2010) (discussing privacy protection as a
way to promote public discourse and interpersonal relationships); Katherine V.
Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance:
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owned privately 62—were (and continue to be) expected to refrain
from actions against the public interest and to comply with all
laws. 63 Although the number of corporations, both public and
private, has grown exponentially since then, 64 this is still mostly
the case today. 65
Corporations, of course, exist to engage in economic activity,
and the fiduciary obligation is to produce as much income and
value for their shareholders as possible while still acting within
the confines of the law. 66 Although several states have allowed
A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 313–14 (2011) (exploring the
history of corporations and how state governments would task the corporations
to serve specific functions intended to benefit the state economy); R. Kent
Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine of ‘Public and Private Corporations’
and the Rise of the American Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 826
(1976) (analyzing the tension between the individuals who made-up the
corporation and the public authority that created it).
62. See Arner, supra note 61, at 47 (discussing how early anti-corporation
debates centered on private business corporations).
63. See id. at 48 (“[B]ecause corporations allowed groups to conduct
business through the mechanism of self-rule and elected representatives,
corporations were essentially democratic institutions.”); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (finding of a duty of good faith
where the corporate fiduciary acts contrary to positive law).
64. See Jackson, supra note 61, at 313–28 (describing the history and
evolution of the corporate form).
65. See Arner, supra note 61, at 44–46 (noting how corporations established
their place in America by the sheer volume in which municipal charters were
requested and granted); see also P. Alexander Quimby, Addressing Corporate
Short-Termism Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389, 389–90 n.8
(2013)
Although the American corporation originated as a vehicle to promote
the public good, that primary purpose slowly eroded and gave way to
a new fixation: increasing shareholder wealth. Yet even as the goal of
individual corporations has changed, the justification for their
existence is still premised—at least in part—on the belief that they
confer an overall benefit to society.
66. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 53 (2008) (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization
norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States.”); see also David G.
Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 194 (2013)
(stating that the idea of corporate primacy is considered foundational and
concrete); Jackson, supra note 61, at 312 (“In popular theory and practice,
corporate governance in America is almost always stated in terms of
maximizing shareholder wealth.”). For cases discussing this “shareholder
primacy” doctrine, see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34
(Del. Ch. 2010) (choosing to act as a for-profit corporation binds the directors to
the fiduciary duties and standards of that model, which includes “maximiz[ing]
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the formation of certain corporations that serve a specific social
purpose, even where it might mean that less value or income is
produced for shareholders, 67 such corporations are few and are
not the subject of this Article.
B. Origin of Limited Liability
Hand-in-hand with corporate formation came limited
shareholder liability—the notion that shareholders are only liable
for the amount of money invested; the rest of their assets are
protected. 68 Limited liability existed as part of English common
law for centuries in the form of “entity law,” which viewed
corporations as separate juridical entities with their rights and
responsibilities distinct from those of their shareholders. 69 After
much debate, limited liability was decisively adopted in 1830
when the leading industrial state at the time—Massachusetts—
enacted a statute codifying limited liability of shareholders for
corporate debts. 70 States began adopting limited liability along
with incorporation statutes to encourage investment in
corporations, and thus, business and economic activity. 71
the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders”); Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(showing that directors have an obligation to maximize the interests of a
corporation’s stockholders even if it is done “at the expense” of others, so long as
it is within the law); Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (finding that a Board of Directors may make decisions
benefiting other stakeholders of the corporation so long as “there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (asserting that a business is created primarily to
generate stockholder profit and the purpose of the directors is to achieve that
end); Yosifon, supra note 66, at 198 (noting that some well-known scholars do
not believe that shareholder maximization as corporate policy exists).
67. Twenty-six states allow for some type of corporate formation that has a
social purpose. For a list of such states and statutory information, see generally
BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://www.benefitcorp.net/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 66, at 79 (detailing the origins of limited
liability and how it protects shareholders assets).
69. See Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 297 (citation
omitted) (describing how the doctrine of limited liability of shareholders for
corporate debts was codified by Massachusetts in 1830).
70. See id. (same).
71. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944) (finding that states
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However, corporations were originally not allowed to own
shares in other corporations. 72 It was not until 1888 when New
Jersey began allowing corporations to own shares in other
corporations that corporate ownership of stock began. 73 Thus,
both investment in corporations and the limited liability that
went along with it only applied to natural persons until the late
1800s. 74
may choose to limit the liability of corporations’ stockholders); Blumberg,
Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 604 (“[Limited liability] was intended to
stimulate economic activity by encouraging widespread investment in corporate
shares. Such investment would result from protecting investors against liability
to corporate creditors and by limiting their risk to the loss of their investment in
the corporation.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability
and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 95–97 (1985) (describing purpose and
advantages of limited liability); see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW
CORPORATE PERSONALITY 56–59 (1993) [hereinafter Blumberg, MULTINATIONAL
CHALLENGE] (providing background on the emergence of corporate groups and
limited liability); see also generally Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of
the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 148 (1992) (“The intention of the original American proponents of
legislative policy of limited liability was that the corporate form be used in the
interest both of economic expansion and democracy.”); STEPHEN PRESSER,
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:12 (2014) (contending that the corporate
entity benefits greatly through limited liability and damage to that doctrine
through various tools such as piercing the veil can hinder the intended function,
and benefit, of limited liability).
72. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 604 (“Limited liability
triumphed at a time when corporations were simple, when one corporation could
not acquire and own shares of another.”); Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of
Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 687, 698 (1998) (stating that historically at common law, a corporation
could not acquire stock in other corporations).
73. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 605, 607 (recounting
the historical roots of corporate ownership of shares in other corporations);
Dearborn, supra note 2, at 203 (noting that New Jersey was the first state to
allow corporations chartered in the state to own stock in other corporations);
Kirshner, supra note 20, at 263 (“Intercorporate stock ownership originally was
outlawed . . . . The first holding company act, which allowed corporations to buy
and hold stock in other corporations, was not adopted until 1888.”); Philip
Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under
United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
493, 494–95 (2002) [hereinafter Blumberg, Human Rights] (“Until New Jersey
radically revised its corporation laws in 1890, corporations were not allowed to
own shares of other corporations and thereby form corporate groups unless
expressly authorized by the legislature.”).
74. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 603–08 (elaborating
on the historical background of American limited liability for corporations).
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Due to this change in corporate ownership of corporate stock,
the late 1800s and early 1900s saw an increase in the use of the
parent-subsidiary structure. 75 As two well-known corporate
scholars noted in 1929, businesses began utilizing subsidiaries in
the early 1920s for a variety of reasons: to increase financing
options; to escape the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of
qualifying the parent corporation as a foreign corporation in a
particular state; to avoid complications involved in the purchase
of physical assets; to retain the goodwill of an established
business unit (i.e., the parent); to avoid taxes; to avoid
cumbersome management structures; and to reap benefits of
limited liability. 76
Today, the limitation on liability extends to the subsidiary’s
actions whether its liabilities lie in contract or in tort, although
the latter developed later. 77 In fact, original conceptions of limited
liability were for contract claims only and not for tort actions. 78
Many scholars claim that limited liability was never meant to
apply to tort claims. 79 Some have made a persuasive case that
limited liability for tortious behavior was not originally intended
due to the fact that individuals and communities might suffer
such torts but be left without a remedy, whereas limited liability
for contracts does not result in the same sort of injustice. 80 Only
75. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 2, at 193 (noting a recent increase in
use of the “subsidiary-parent structure”).
76. See id. (explaining reasons for using subsidiaries).
77. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 202 (noting that from the inception of
limited liability, opponents have focused on liability in contract, not tort).
78. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 3, at 600 (remarking that
tort liability was actively excluded from statutes imposing statutory liability for
corporate debts); Leebron, supra note 24, at 1566–67 (“[T]he doctrine of limited
liability has its origins in quite a different time and circumstance, when the
protection of contractual creditors, not tort victims, was the overwhelming
countervailing concern.”).
79. See Thompson, Unpacking, supra note 24, at 4 (acknowledging that
owners of closely held businesses or corporations regularly escape liability for
torts); Leebron, supra note 24, at 1567 (seeking to establish the “valid
justifications for limited liability and the implications of those justifications for
limiting the tort liability of investors”).
80. See Thompson, Unpacking, supra note 24, at 2 (“Indeed, some believe
that corporate law undercuts tort law and represents a nineteenth-century relic
that should be swept away in the face of current tort learning.”); Virginia
Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law
Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 136 (2013) (reasoning
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the other member of the contract—who stands to benefit if the
contract is completed and thus takes a knowing risk—is hurt
when the subsidiary company cannot pay a contractual debt.
When a subsidiary engages in a tort that harms non-consenting
individuals or communities, and those individuals or
communities cannot obtain a remedy from the subsidiary, then
they are left without a remedy—all without their consent. 81 In
this way, limited liability moves risks to non-consenting parties
in a way that limited liability for contract does not. 82 Thus, these
scholars argue, limited liability could not have been intended to
limit liability for torts. 83
But limited liability for corporate torts came to be fairly early
on in the country’s history, 84 apparently under the assumption
that as with contracts, limited liability for torts was necessary for
economic investment and activity. 85 Professor Daniel Kahan
credits an 1835 case of the New York Supreme Court of
Judicature (then the highest court in New York) as conferring
limited liability to torts. 86 Over the next fifty years, the rule was
quickly adopted throughout the United States. 87 The Supreme
that limited liability can encourage unreasonable risk-taking that leads to
tortious harm of third parties who are unable to protect themselves from injury
by corporate negligence, unlike creditors who are able to contract).
81. See Daniel R. Kahan, Note, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A
Historical Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1090 (2009) (showing how limited
liability for shareholders protects the shareholders’ assets, but still allows those
harmed by the corporation’s actions to seek a remedy from the corporation’s own
assets).
82. See id. at 1089–91 (discussing contractual limited liability).
83. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (explaining purposes of
limited liability in contract versus tort).
84. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 1098–101 (recounting the beginnings of
tort limited liability, starting in the late 1700s and gaining momentum in the
mid-nineteenth century).
85. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 202–03 (describing how extending
limited liability to tort creditors is “essential to the functioning of the modern
corporate economy”).
86. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 1098–99 (“[A]ny person or persons having
any demand against the said corporation, may sue any stockholder or
stockholders, in any court having cognizance thereof, and recover the same with
costs . . . .” (quoting Heacock & Lockwood v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58, 60 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1835))
87. See id. at 1100–01 (noting the cognizable impact the Heacock decision
had on other courts because New York was, and remains, a leader in the
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Court confirmed the rule in 1885 in Chase v. Curtis. 88 Professor
Kahan notes that by that time, there was “no doubt that a tort
was not a ‘debt’ for which shareholders could be liable absent
other legislation.” 89
Thus, regardless of whether it was originally tended to limit
liability for torts, there is no question that the general rule now is
that limited liability does protect shareholders—including
corporate shareholders—from financial consequences of their
subsidiaries’ torts, even where individuals may be left without a
remedy.
C. The Growth of Transnational Corporations Has Not Affected
Limited Liability of Parent Corporations
Transnational business, including the number of parent
corporations and subsidiaries, has grown exponentially over the
last forty years as developing countries have campaigned to
attract transnational business, resulting in reduced red tape and
regulations. 90 In 1970, there were approximately 7,000
transnational corporations (TNCs) in the world; that number
grew to 30,000 by 1990, to 63,000 by 2000, and to 82,000 by

development of corporate law).
88. See Chase v. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452, 462–64 (1885) (affirming limited
liability for torts).
89. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 1101 (noting one exception, California,
whose statutes and constitution used a more comprehensive construction that
included both “liabilities” and “debts,” allowing plaintiffs to recover from
shareholders for torts).
90. See Ramon Torrent & Federico Lavopa, Strengthening Enforcement of
Core Labour Rights: Can a New Investment Agreement Model Help
Multinational Corporations Be More Socially Responsible?, in CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LATIN AMERICA: A COLLECTION OF RESEARCH PAPERS
FROM THE UNCTAD VIRTUAL INSTITUTE NETWORK 101, 105 (2010) (citing Rhys
Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct. Self-Regulation in a Global Economy, 2
TECH., BUS. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2001)) (describing the major shift in the “will and
ability” of developing countries to control the activities of multinational
corporations (MNCs), and the emphasis on attracting them over regulating
them).
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2009. 91 Today, there are more than 100,000 multinational
corporations with over 900,000 foreign affiliates. 92
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
notes that it is difficult to compile data on transnational
corporations due to complexities and categorizations of holding
companies, and the fact that a subsidiary can be owned by
multiple parent corporations. 93 The current World Investment
Report discusses Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to indicate
growth and health of the world economy. 94 According to the 2014
report,
FDI outflows from developing countries also reached a record
level. Transnational corporations (TNCs) from developing
economies are increasingly acquiring foreign affiliates from
developed countries located in their regions. Developing and
transition economies together invested $553 billion, or 39 per
cent of global FDI outflows, compared with only 12 per cent at
the beginning of the 2000. 95

These statistics demonstrate a rather large jump in the
globalization of companies. Such growth brings with it complex
legal structures and complex problems. Even with this large
increase in the numbers of transnational corporations and FDI,
which has arguably led to an increase in business activity in host
countries at the expense of communities, limited liability has
continued unabated. 96 As this Article notes, given the enormous
tax and financial benefits parent corporations receive as a result

91. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Development and Production,
xxi, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (July 2009).
92. Damiano de Felice, Business and Human Rights Indicators to Measure
the Corporate Responsibility to Respect: Challenges and Opportunities, 37 HUM.
RTS. Q. 511, 517 (2015).
93. Transnational Corporations Statistics, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-Corporations-Statistics.aspx
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. See generally U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World
Investment Report 2014 Overview: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2014 (2014).
95. Id. at ix.
96. See generally id. (discussing growth of TNCs and FDI).
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of their subsidiaries economic activity in host countries, many
have started to question limited liability of parent corporations. 97
D. Piercing the Corporate Veil Is Difficult
Perhaps due to the unfairness and dire consequences of
limited liability, courts in various states have set forth tests
where, if plaintiffs can satisfy certain factors, they can overcome
limited liability and hold the shareholders, including corporate
parents, liable for damages, commonly referred to as “piercing the
corporate veil.” 98 Piercing the corporate veil, as well as its vague
and oftentimes inconsistent application, has received significant
scholarly attention. 99
97. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the tax benefits
and advantages of foreign subsidiaries).
98. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 203–04 (outlining the idea of “piercing
the corporate veil,” which is the “state common-law exception to a state
statutory grant of limited liability”); see also supra note 6 and accompanying
text (defining “piercing the corporate veil”).
99. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing,
26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001); J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability
and Veil Piercing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1063 (2003); Thomas K. Cheng, Form and
Substance of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 80 MISS. L.J. 497
(2010); Dante Figueroa, Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in
the United States and Latin America, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 683 (2012); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding
the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853 (1997); Mark R.
Hinkston, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 79 WIS. L. REV. 12 (2006); Rebecca J.
Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the
Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2001);
Mark J. Loewenstein, Veil Piercing to Non-Owners: A Practical and Theoretical
Inquiry, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 839 (2011); Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts,
Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014); Jonathan A. Marcantel, Because
Judges Are Not Angels Either: Limiting Judicial Discretion by Introducing
Objectivity into Piercing Doctrine, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 191 (2011); John H.
Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of
Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1091 (2009); John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2010); Douglas C. Michael,
To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41 (2000); David Millon, Piercing the Corporate
Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1305 (2007); David Millon, Response, The Still-Elusive Quest to Make Sense
of Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 25 (2009); Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the
Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L.
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The tests vary from state to state, but generally speaking,
the veil can be pierced, resulting in liability for a parent
corporation, where the parent misuses the separate corporate
form for wrongful purposes and controls the subsidiary to the
extent that the subsidiary is a mere instrument of the parent. 100
Courts look to a variety of factors, such as: whether there was a
misrepresentation or wrongful conduct; whether there was an
intermingling of funds; whether there was a failure to follow
corporate formalities; whether there was undercapitalization of
the subsidiary; the independence of the subsidiary’s board of
directors; the existence of common decision-making, common
policies, and common policymakers between the parent and
subsidiary; and whether the parent and subsidiary share
directors and officers. 101
529 (2007); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection of State
Corporation Law and Employee Compensation Programs: Is it Curtains for Veil
Piercing?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059 (1996); Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 81 (2010); Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2013);
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to
Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063 (2006); Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the
Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (2008); Kurt A.
Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637 (2005);
John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon
Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2004); Thompson, supra note 1; Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L.
REV. 619 (2005); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate
Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379
(1999); Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies:
The Need for a Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 51 (2004); Gregory
Bell, Comment, Veil Piercing and LLCS: Supporting the Case for a Meaningful,
Legislated Standard, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 615 (2011); Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the
Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143 (1194);
Richmond McPherson & Nader Raja, Corporate Justice: An Empirical Study of
Piercing Rates and Factors Courts Consider When Piercing the Corporate Veil,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 931 (2010) (presenting empirical study of the frequency
that courts pierce the corporate veil).
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting a multitude of
academic articles recognizing problems associated with piercing the corporate
veil); see also supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (citing cases that applied
limited liability of shareholders to parent corporations).
101. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d
13, 18 (1996) (listing factors considered in deciding whether to pierce the veil,
including “intermingling of corporate and personal funds, undercapitalization of
the corporation, failure to observe corporate formalities . . . and the inactivity of
other officers and directors” (citation omitted)); supra note 5 and accompanying
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Some might argue that the current doctrine of “piercing the
corporate veil” is sufficient, and that parent companies should
only be liable where that test is satisfied. However, many have
documented that the test is vague and inconsistently applied by
courts. 102 Although it remains an option, the test is typically very
difficult to satisfy, and impossible to satisfy without showing that
the parent controlled the subsidiary. 103 As described in more
detail below, victims of subsidiaries’ violations of human rights
norms and environmental disasters have typically not been able
to pierce the corporate veil. 104
text (citing cases that applied limited liability to parent corporations);
Thompson, supra note 1, at 1064 (noting in his empirical study that lack of
misrepresentation was the factor most cited by courts when refusing to pierce
the veil). Thompson further notes that
the group of factors most associated with successful piercing (with the
empirical results given in parentheses) included several of the
tradition conclusory factors: “instrumentality” (97.33%), “alter ego”
(95.58%), and “dummy” (89.74%) . . . . Factors leading less often to a
piercing result were under-capitalization (73%) and failure to follow
corporate formalities (67%). Still further down the success ladder
were judicial citations to domination and control (57%) . . . and
overlap of various sorts between the corporation and the shareholder
(57%). Other commonalities were less often associated with piercing.
Courts pierced only 59% of the time when they listed common offices
and only half of the time for common officers. Even less important
were common directors (courts pierced only 45% of the time when this
factor was mentioned) and common owners (49%). These results
suggest that courts are looking beyond the formal overlap of
shareholders, directors, and officers to see if businesses show other
signs of intertwining between the corporation and the shareholder.
Id. at 1064.
102. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 204 (“While a member of the New York
Court of Appeals, Judge Cardozo famously said that piercing is ‘enveloped in the
mists of metaphor.’ Professors Easterbrook and Fischel elaborated: ‘Piercing’
seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.”
(citing Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926))); see also
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 110 (evaluating courts’ application of
the veil-piercing doctrine); Bainbridge, supra note 99, at 96 (“It seems unlikely
that veil piercing even inadvertently addresses concerns over negative
externalities. As our review of the doctrine demonstrated, the law of veil
piercing is remarkably vague.”). For a detailed empirical review of the
inconsistencies of the piercing test, see Thompson, supra note 1, at 1047–70
(analyzing results of veil-piercing study).
103. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 208 (“If a subsidiary and a parent
corporation take simple steps, like keeping adequate minutes of meetings and
maintaining separate bank accounts, liability in a piercing claim is unlikely.”).
104. See generally infra Part III.
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In my view, piercing the corporate veil is simply not an
adequate solution; the piercing test does not even take into
consideration the unfairness limited liability creates in certain
situations, where parent corporations benefit financially at the
human rights or environmental expense of an often
nonconsenting community.
Parenthetically, the fact that courts have chosen to hold
parent companies liable only where plaintiffs can pierce the veil
by meeting specific elements, including wrongdoing, rather than
considering the benefit corporations receive from subsidiaries and
the harm to the victims, may be in line with fault-based notions
of tort. However, it is antithetical to those more recently
developed areas of tort where the focus is on who should bear the
costs of harm, such as product liability, 105 strict liability, 106 and
respondeat superior liability (the case of employers liable for acts
of their employees). 107
III. Host Countries Where Foreign Subsidiaries Operate Often
Fail to Provide Adequate Remedies for Victims
At the risk of stating the obvious, if the victims could bring a
claim in their own country and obtain a remedy, there would be
no need to bring a suit against a parent company in its home
jurisdiction. In the ideal world, all countries would have
regulatory and judicial systems sufficient to both prevent
large-scale harm to individuals and communities and to provide
105. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 217
(4th ed. 2012) (noting that with products liability, the strictness of liability
amounted to an instrument of regulatory and compensation policy); id. at 228
(noting that in general the manufacturer is probably in the better position to
spread the cost of the defects that are not cost-effective to otherwise eliminate).
106. See id. at 195–96 (noting two arguments for strict liability: (1) those
who injure are in the best position to broadly distribute the costs of nonnegligently caused accidents and (2) those who benefit from engaging in the
activity should rightly bear the costs associated with the activity and pay for
any injuries).
107. See id. at 214 (discussing the benefits of vicarious liability, including:
(1) the employer is in a better position to make the decisions that affect accident
levels; (2) employees will more likely be judgment proof than employers; and
(3) the loss-distribution function of strict liability plays a role in supporting this
doctrine).
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for a remedy in the event that businesses engage in tortious
actions. Countries would ensure causes of action exist, that their
judiciaries are fair, corruption-free, and functional, and that
companies, including foreign-owned subsidiaries have sufficient
funds to pay any award of compensation (or are otherwise
insured for negligent torts). The problem is that this is often not
the case in many countries where foreign-owned subsidiaries
operate (host countries), which are often developing countries
seeking to attract transnational business. 108
108. See Christen Broecker, Note, “Better the Devil You Know”: Home State
Approaches to Transnational Corporate Accountability, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 159, 184–85 (2008) (indicating the plight of impoverished states whose
great need for investment allows a corporation to affect those states’ policies and
willingness to address human rights abuses); Brittany T. Cragg, Comment,
Home is Where the Halt Is: Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility Through
Home State Regulation and Social Disclosure, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 735, 751–
55 (2010) (suggesting extraterritorial home-state enforcement of transnational
corporation (TNC) standards, even though responsibility of monitoring TNCs
normally lies with the host state, because TNCs generally have subsidiaries in
developing countries and often hold more wealth, and therefore bargaining
power, than the countries they are in); Erin Foley Smith, Note, Right to
Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non Conveniens: Opening U.S. Courts
to Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
145, 156–58 (2010) (discussing difficulties human rights victims often have in
bringing actions against transnational corporations in host states and the
reluctance of home states to enforce human rights standards); see also
Catherine Boggs, Project Management: A Smorgasbord of International
Operating Risks, Introduction (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Inst., Paper No.
13, 2008) (noting that companies, especially those in the extraction industry,
who want to do business in developing countries are exposed to a variety of risks
commonly characterized by the potential for rapidly changing political regimes,
endemic corruption, governments lacking in capacity and expertise, and weak or
insufficient legal institutions (citing Operating Risk in Emerging Markets,
Economist Intelligence Unit (2006)); Lesley K. McAllister, On Environmental
Enforcement and Compliance: A Reply to Professor Crawford’s Review of Making
Law Matter: Environmental Protection and Legal Institutions in Brazil, 40 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 649, 679–80 (2009) (explaining that the effectiveness of law
in developing countries is constrained by factors such as prioritization of
economic development goals, inadequate agency resources, inadequate judicial
resources, and the weakness of mobilization by the beneficiaries of
environmental law); Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of Persons
Undergoing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent,
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 532–33 (2002) (discussing how many African
nations fear that “legislation, and resulting lawsuits, could have a chilling effect
on beneficial research efforts” and thus have inadequate protective legislation);
Skinner, supra note 18, at 169–73 (noting that “legislative and judicial
protection in underdeveloped and often corrupt host countries is nonexistent”
(quoting Samantha Evans, The Globalization of Drug Testing: Enforcing
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First, many of these host countries do not have sufficient
regulations to prevent harm; in fact, as a result of globalization,
many have done away with regulations they used to have in order
to attract transnational business. 109 Second, there is often a high
level of corruption in government and business operations, as
well as corruption in the judicial system. 110 In particular, many
countries hosting subsidiaries that engage in extraction or other
industries have a high potential for human rights abuses, have
ineffectual and corrupt judicial systems, or no mechanism for
victims harmed by businesses’ actions to seek or obtain
redress. 111 Third, sometimes there is simply not a statutory or
Informed Consent Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 477, 479 (2005))).
109. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 169–73 (explaining that such “countries’
dependence on investment and inflows of capital in an atmosphere of
deregulation has resulted in a race to the bottom in terms of regulation of
business activities”); see also Kirshner, supra note 20, at 266–67 (noting that
certain countries will refrain from making certain activities illegal in order to
encourage foreign investment and that multinational corporations can wield
their power to avoid punishment even when they engage in wrongdoing).
110. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 169–73 (discussing the failings of host
countries in holding transnational corporations accountable for their wrongs);
see also supra note 108 and accompanying text (citing sources describing the
challenges faced by host countries, which are often developing countries).
111. See Boggs, supra note 108, § 3.0, (describing the challenges
corporations face “in countries where bribery and corruption are endemic and
appear firmly ensconced as a part of customary business practices”); Kirshner,
supra note 20, at 266–67 (noting that many host countries often lack functioning
ega systems or may not have sufficient resources to bring multinationals to
justice). The fact that many host countries involved in the extraction industry
have corrupt or ineffective judicial systems, and that human rights are often
violated with impunity, is also confirmed by the U.S. Department of State. See
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. & LAB., http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2013/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (evaluating human-rights practices in various
countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For example, the
report for the Democratic Republic of the Congo lists “lack of an independent
and effective judiciary; and impunity throughout the country for many serious
abuses, including unlawful killings, disappearances, torture, rapes, and
arbitrary arrests and detention” as two of the country’s three most severe
human rights problems. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS.
& LAB., DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1
(2013), http://www.state.gov/ documents/ organization/220312.pdf. The report
for Nigeria notes that “[i]mpunity remained widespread at all levels of
government,” and notes various issues: that political leaders influenced the
judiciary, particularly at the state and local levels; that understaffing,
underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption continued to prevent the judiciary
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common law basis to bring a claim. 112 Fourth, it might be that
victims bring a suit against the subsidiary in the host state and
receive a verdict, but are then unable to collect due to lack of
funds, underfunding, or bankruptcy.
Fifth, due to the complexity of corporate structure,
sometimes victims are simply unable to identify which subsidiary
is operating in their area and thus, are unable to determine
which entity to bring a claim against. 113 What can be even more
confusing is that the subsidiary may be using the “logo” of the
parent company, leading to confusion about the entity operating
in the area and thus responsible, as has been reported to have
occurred in Nigeria with Shell (trucks owned by the subsidiary
had the Shell logo on the side) in Kiobel. 114 Indeed, “a classic
obstacle involving litigation against transnational businesses is
from functioning adequately; that judges frequently fail to appear for trials,
often because they were pursuing other sources of income and sometimes
because of threats against them; and that there was a widespread perception
that judges were easily bribed and litigants could not rely on the courts to
render impartial judgments. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM.
RTS. & LAB., NIGERIA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2, 12–13 (2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220358.pdf.
The
report
on
Guatemala notes that “[p]rincipal human rights abuses included widespread
institutional corruption, particularly in the police and judicial sectors” and
“[t]he judicial system failed to provide fair or timely trials due to inefficiency,
corruption, insufficient personnel, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and
witnesses.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. & LAB.,
GUATEMALA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1, 7 (2013), http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/220657.pdf. The report on Indonesia, known for
its garment industry, provides that country-wide corruption, trafficking in
persons, child labor, and failure to enforce labor standards and worker rights are
issues that plague the country. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUM. RTS. & LAB., INDONESIA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220408.pdf.
112. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 227 (explaining how “[c]hoice of law”
principles can “create unforeseen barriers to recovery”).
113. See id. at 244 (“For example, parent companies over which the courts
have jurisdiction may deny any involvement in subsidiaries' actions, yet often
will not produce information regarding the subsidiaries, including information
regarding their relationships to the subsidiaries.”); see also Tara van Ho,
Comments at the United Nations’ Third Annual Forum on Business and Human
Rights (Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the inability victims in host countries often
have in identifying the corporate entity involved in tortious conduct) (notes on
file with author).
114. Kiobel v. Dutch Royal Shell, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013); see Ho, supra
note 113 (explaining the inability victims in host countries often have in
identifying the corporate entity involved in tortious conduct).
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that corporate groups are organized as a network of distinct legal
entities, with variable degrees of influence exercised by the
parent company over its subsidiaries, sister companies, or joint
ventures.” 115
Sixth, victims may have legitimate fears of retaliation by the
business or the members of the community if they bring a
claim. 116 Seventh, victims may not have the ability to get the
evidence they need to bring a lawsuit; bringing a lawsuit may be
too costly; or they may simply be unable to find a lawyer in that
country willing to bring a suit in court. 117 All of these factors
converge to create a situation where victims are likely to have
little recourse in their own countries. 118
A. Limited Liability Has Prevented Victims of Foreign
Subsidiaries’ Violations of Human Rights Norms from Seeking
and Obtaining a Remedy When Unable to Do So in Host Country
Limited liability, then, only becomes a problem when victims
cannot obtain a remedy against the subsidiary in their own
country. In that situation, they are left with bringing suit against
a parent corporation in the parent’s jurisdiction as their only
form of potential remedy. 119 But limited liability will usually
prevent any recovery. This is problematic for any harm, but
especially problematic when the harm is great, such as with
115. Skinner, supra note 18, at 215; see also Kirshner, supra note 20, at
266–67 (explaining how multinational corporations structure themselves to
avoid a court’s jurisdiction, and how they can shift financial assets within a
corporate group); Ho, supra note 80, at 116–17 (“At its core, state corporate law
governs the formation and ‘internal affairs’ of discrete legal entities, each with
limited liability. It says little about the corporate group as an economic
enterprise . . . .”).
116. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 172, 231–34 (discussing how the
potential for “unwarranted counterclaims or retaliatory claims” can dissuade
victims from litigating human rights issues).
117. See id. (noting how the “loser pays” system common in host countries
can serve as a barrier to representation).
118. See id. (recognizing that “victims . . . would much rather bring cases in
the host countries as long as the judiciary was fair, stable, and effective, and the
victims felt safe bringing such claims”).
119. See Cragg, supra note 108, at 754–55 (explaining the two means by
which “[a] home state can find liability on its [Transnational Corporations]”).
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serious environmental torts or large-scale human rights
violations.
These are not theoretical problems. There are many cases of
victims harmed by U.S. corporations’ subsidiaries’ violations of
human rights having some or all of their claims dismissed due to
the parent corporations’ limited liability. 120
120. Many advocates report that limited liability has been a significant
barrier and that due to the doctrine, they have not brought claims against
parent companies in the United States, even though claims against subsidiaries
in host countries could not be brought nor had any chance of prevailing. See
Skinner, supra note 18, at 165, 212–17 (noting how “the author identified the
barriers and their impact on accessing judicial remedies primarily through
consultations with practitioners . . . government officials, and corporate counsel
in the United States, Canada, and, along with Professors Olivier De Schutter
and Robert McCorquodale, [several] European countries”); Gwynne Skinner et
al., The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations
by Transnational Business, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE 29, 61, 79–
80, 80 nn.483–84 (Dec. 2013), http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TheThird-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-Remedies-for-Human-Rights-Violation-byTransnational-Business.pdf (describing barriers to judicial remedies). Numerous
cases provide examples of this difficulty. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co.,
796 F.3d 160, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that plaintiffs were unable to state
a claim under the ATS even though there were alleged human rights violations
in South Africa); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2012)
(dismissing claims against Coca-Cola U.S.A. for a subsidiary’s role in Egypt’s
illegal expropriation of land for failing to allege allegations to pierce the
corporate veil), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 952 (2013); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (noting
claims should be dismissed against Shell for, inter alia, acts of its subsidiary
where plaintiffs could not pierce the corporate veil in case involving numerous
human rights allegations for oil exploration and production in Nigeria), aff’d,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding the parent oil corporation not liable in class action suit brought by
Burmese citizens where the court determined parent was not alter ego of
subsidiary for purposes of jurisdiction); William v. AES Corp., 28 F. Supp. 3d
553, 561–63 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding plaintiffs could not pierce the corporate veil
and hold parent U.S. electricity corporation liable for actions of Cameroon
subsidiary—which in some cases destroyed property, caused deaths, and
engaged in cruel and inhumane degrading treatment—and dismissing case
against subsidiary for lack of personal jurisdiction); In re S. Afr. Apartheid
Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 270, 274–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting theories to
pierce the corporate veil, but allowing theory of agency to proceed against some
defendants, who were ultimately dismissed for failure to overcome Kiobel’s
presumption of extraterritoriality); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 681–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying motion to
amend complaint to allege alter ego and agency theories in case alleging
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, because plaintiff did not
proffer enough evidence to pierce the corporate veil between the parent
corporation and certain of its subsidiaries), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009);

RETHINKING LIMITED LIABILITY

1805

Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1246–49 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (finding parent oil corporation could not be held liable for alleged human
rights abuses in Nigeria based on alter ego theory; although the court allowed
the case to proceed on agency theory, the jury ultimately found for Chevron in
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010)); Sinaltrainal v.
Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354–55 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding U.S.
based Coca-Cola not liable for the murder of a Columbian employee by a
paramilitary group for his efforts to unionize the Coca-Cola bottling plant run
by a subsidiary in Columbia because plaintiffs failed to make sufficient
allegations to pierce the corporate veil or proceed on agency theory), aff’d in
relevant part, 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009). Limited liability has also
prevented victims from obtaining a remedy for environmental harms. See
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63–64 (1998) (finding “that when (but
only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be
charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary’s actions”). Limited
liability has additionally prevented victims from obtaining a remedy for harms
caused by acts of subsidiaries in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Se. Tex. Inns,
Inc. v. Prime Hosp. Corp., 462 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding parent
corporation not liable for subsidiary’s actions based on allegations of “mere
breach of an underlying contract”); Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1239–40 (1st
Cir. 1996) (deciding that parent corporation could not be held liable for
subsidiary’s actions when the requirements for piercing the corporate veil were
not satisfied); Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1459–64 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding parent corporation not liable under Delaware or New York law); In re
Birmingham Asbestos Litig., 997 F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
parent corporations can only be held liable if the corporate veil is pierced under
the doctrine of limited liability); Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305,
311 (8th Cir. 1992) (declining to find parent corporation liable for subsidiary’s
actions because doctrine of limited liability “would largely be destroyed if a
parent corporation could be held liable simply on the basis of errors in business
judgment”); Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 983–84 (5th
Cir. 1984) (explaining that a parent corporation is not liable for wholly-owned
subsidiary actions when not used for fraud or injustice); Toumazou v. Turkish
Republic of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that “bare
recitations of the requirements for alter-ego liability” are not enough alone to
justify piercing the corporate veil). Similarly, there have been additional cases
where limited liability has prevented recovery against a parent after a court has
rejected argument that subsidiary’s employees engaging in wrongful conduct
were not also employees of the parent. See, e.g., In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage &
Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that the
parent corporation was not a joint employer of subsidiary’s employees); Brown v.
Fred’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 736, 739–40 (8th Cir. 2007) (following the “strong
presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s
employees” (quoting Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir.
1993))); Corrigan v. U.S. Steel Corp., 478 F.3d 718, 724–26 (6th Cir. 2007)
(finding the parent corporation not liable as employer of subsidiary’s employees
when requirements for piercing the corporate veil not satisfied); Papa v. Katy
Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding parent corporation not
liable for actions of subsidiary when parent failed to provide a strict “Chinese
wall” between parent and subsidiary); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062,
1071 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding parent corporation not liable to subsidiary
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There is no question that more needs to be done to ensure
that victims have protection and recourse in their own
countries—the host countries. However, where that is not
possible, should the victims be able to bring suit against a parent
in the parent’s own jurisdiction? Given these dilemmas, what
responsibility should parent companies bear for these harms?
Should it matter if the parent creates the subsidiary for the sole
purpose of operating in a country that the parent knows has an
ineffectual or judicial system or a system that otherwise does not
offer a remedy to those harmed, even by the most egregious acts
(“high-risk countries”)? In relation to these questions, normative
arguments for such parent liability do exist. 121 However, given
that limited liability is so entrenched in the law, there must be
compelling reasons offered to justify holding a parent corporation
liable for acts of its subsidiary in situations where plaintiffs
cannot pierce the corporate veil. 122
IV. Normative Arguments for Corporate Parent Liability
At this time, there is no clear, binding legal obligation under
either domestic or international law requiring that parent
corporations be held liable for torts committed by their foreign
subsidiaries, even where those torts violate international human

employees under Title VII for claims of sexual harassment when the only basis
for piercing the corporate veil was common ownership); Lusk v. Foxmeyer
Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 775, 777–78 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claims that
the “parent corporation may be held liable for the allegedly discriminatory
conduct of its subsidiary” and that the parent and subsidiary were a single
employer); Marzano v. Comput. Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 513–14 (3d Cir. 1996)
(following the presumption that the parent company is not the employer of
subsidiary’s employees); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir.
1993) (“The doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that a
parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees, and the courts
have found otherwise only in extraordinary circumstances.” (citing Johnson v.
Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 980–81 (4th Cir. 1987))).
121. See infra Part IV (Normative Arguments for Corporate Parent
Liability).
122. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical
Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615 (1997) (describing the historical
prevalence of limited liability and its solidified status in modern day law).

RETHINKING LIMITED LIABILITY

1807

rights norms, although there is persuasive authority in the form
of the U.N. Guiding Principles, as discussed infra in Part V. 123
One could make a variety of ethical, 124 and thus normative,
arguments as to why parent companies that benefit from
subsidiaries’ activities should not be able to escape liability for
the subsidiaries’ torts, even where a parent does not control a
subsidiary. With regard to human rights violations by
subsidiaries of corporations headquartered in the United States,
such arguments are particularly persuasive where the parent
creates or purchases a subsidiary knowing that it will operate in
a country where victims of possible harm have no ability to obtain
a remedy. 125
A. Parent Corporations Obtain Numerous Benefits from
Subsidiaries’ Operations While Shifting the Risks to
Non-Consenting Third Parties
A straight-forward, stand-alone ethical argument can be
made that parent corporations should be held liable for the acts of
their subsidiaries operating abroad simply where subsidiaries
operate in high-risk countries and shift the costs and risks of
potential human rights and environmental abuses to
non-consenting individuals and communities. The benefits parent
corporations receive for actions of subsidiaries are immense. They
include, inter alia, lower production and labor costs, shareholder
income and payouts and preferential tax treatment. 126
First, many transnational businesses have a foreign
subsidiary operating abroad in order to manufacture goods in
host countries where labor, manufacturing, and regulatory costs
may be lower. 127 Second, like individual shareholders, parent
corporations receive foreign subsidiaries’ income in the form of
123. Infra Part V.
124. By an ethical argument, I mean a set of principles that dictates right
and wrong behavior, often based on morality.
125. See, e.g., Law, supra note 22, at 1334–37 (discussing the relationship
between human rights and economic growth).
126. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing the
advantages of having a foreign subsidiary).
127. See Chow, supra note 19, at 816–17 (describing advantages of low labor
costs and lenient regulatory regimes).
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shareholder dividends. 128 Moreover, U.S. corporations can use
foreign subsidiaries to take advantage of the U.S. tax code and
reduce taxes they pay on the income through two primary
methods: deferral of income of the subsidiaries and transfer
pricing manipulation.
Corporations can defer a subsidiary’s income to ensure they
are taxed in lower tax jurisdictions. 129 For example, the parent
can establish and operate a subsidiary in a foreign country and
keep the profits abroad, not having to include the subsidiary’s
income on its taxes until the income is returned to the United
States, subject to certain exceptions. 130 Moreover, financial
accounting rules allow corporations to treat the temporary tax
deferral as though it is permanent as long as they assert that the
deferral is indefinite, and that the parent does not intend to
return the profits to the United States in the near future. 131
Transfer pricing principles allow corporate parents to shift
income from high tax to low tax jurisdictions through the use of a
subsidiary by allowing its various entities to sell or transfer goods
or services among each other. 132 For example, a parent
corporation might seek to concentrate higher profits for goods
sold in a lower tax jurisdiction, and thus, taxes on profits will be
lower than if those profits were realized in a high tax
128. See, e.g., Julie Roin, The Grand Illusion: A Neutral System for the
Taxation of International Transactions, 75 VA. L. REV. 919, 938 (1989) (“[T]he
foreign earnings of a foreign subsidiary, even one owned entirely by U.S.
shareholders, are subject only to foreign income tax.”).
129. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 192 (2002) (identifying the tax preference granted to U.S. businesses
operating abroad through the deferral of U.S. tax until repatriation as having
great import and noting that the privilege of deferral is deepened in accordance
with the level of tax in the low tax foreign jurisdiction).
130. See Hanna, Real Value, supra note 19, at 231–32 (describing this
strategy).
131. This is accomplished through the Accounting Principles Board (APB)
Opinion 23. See id. (noting that APB 23 essentially lowers the U.S. parent’s tax
rate).
132. See Cym H. Lowell, Significance of Transfer Pricing for Multinational
Enterprises, in U.S. INT’L TAX: AGREEMENTS, CHECKLISTS AND COMMENTARY
¶ 2.05, ¶ 2.05 (2015) (describing transfer pricing as “a quintessential three-way
contest pitting tax administration against tax administration, in bilateral
treaty-country matters, with the taxpayer often occupying the position of
stakeholder in the middle”).
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jurisdiction. 133 Similarly, a parent can shift costs to itself or an
entity in high-tax countries so that the costs the parent deducts
will be maximized. 134
These financial benefits notwithstanding, the fact that
parent corporations benefit financially through the use of
subsidiaries may not be enough in and of itself for policymakers
to be convinced that a parent corporation, or the society or
government of its home country, has an ethical obligation to
provide a remedy to those harmed by a subsidiary’s action, given
that the law treats these subsidiaries as independent actors and
that they may in fact be operating independently. Thus, a
stronger ethical argument for holding a parent corporation liable
exists where, in addition to the numerous financial benefits
through the use of a subsidiary, harmed individuals cannot
obtain a remedy against the subsidiary (or parent) in the host
country. When a subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation commits
serious tort violations, non-consenting individuals and
communities are left to bear all the costs. When such victims are
not able to seek remedy from the host country, they are left
without the ability to seek accountability or compensation for
their harm. They, and they alone, absorb the cost of the harm,
while the host country, the parent corporation, the U.S.
government, and U.S. citizens benefit.
The U.S. public should care when communities are harmed
due to acts of foreign subsidiaries while U.S. parent corporations,
the U.S. government, and they themselves, indirectly through
U.S. government expenditures from the tax revenue, derive such
benefits. They probably would if they were more aware of the
harm sometimes sustained by such communities. Why should the
U.S public care about the well-being of other societies? Because
society is comprised of human beings, most of whom have a moral
consciousness. Societies enact legislation that benefits others
because, as a collective, human beings care about and sympathize

133. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX
400 (2003) (explaining transfer pricing).
134. See Markus Henn, Tax Havens and the Taxation of Transnational
Corporations 6 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Policy Analysis June
2013), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/10082.pdf (providing examples of
tax evasion practices).

1810

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015)

with other people. 135 Humans “value the lives and happiness of
other humans,” and thus there is reason to refrain from certain
actions because they harm others. 136 The famous philosopher
David Hume argued that morality was founded in sympathies,
and that humans care when they see people suffering; that
humans care about other people and have a vested interest in
their happiness, and thus have reason to treat them with respect
and kindness. 137 In addition, because society is made up of
individuals, such individuals have reason to act in ways that
benefit society and refrain from acting in ways that are harmful
to society. 138 Another ethical argument is simply that a society
needs to abide by certain rules with regard to how others are
treated, or risk being treated the same way. In this way, an
ethical argument arises out of a need to keep public order for
individuals’ own happiness. 139
Moreover, another answer lies in the same reasons the
international community sees for ratifying international human
rights treaties and other treaties regarding the treatment a
country inflicts on its citizenry: the prevention of turmoil and
upheaval that results in countries with horrific human rights

135. See, e.g., Thurstjm, Writing an Ethical Argument, HUBPAGES (Oct. 10,
2012), http://thurstjm.hubpages.com/hub/Writing-an-Ethical-Argument (last
visited Nov. 12, 2015) (“Ethical philosophers have often defined the word ethical
as a word used to describe an action that we have a reason to do because we
care about and sympathize with other people.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 368–69
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896) (1739) (discussing compassion generally).
136. Thurstjm, supra note 135.
137. See generally Mark Collier, Hume’s Theory of Moral Imagination, 27
HIST. PHIL. Q. 255 (2010) (discussing the “hybrid theory of sympathy”
articulated by David Hume); HUME, supra note 135, at 619 (“[T]he happiness of
strangers affects us by sympathy alone . . . which arises from the survey of all
those virtues, that are useful to society . . . . These form the most considerable
part of morality.”).
138. See JOHN B. STEWART, OPINION AND REFORM IN HUME’S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 124 (Princeton University Press 2014) (discussing David Hume’s
theories on explaining moral behavior).
139. See P.J. PROUDHON, GENERAL IDEAS OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 112 (John Beverley Robinson trans., Dover Publications
2013) (1851) (discussing the nature of the “social contract [that] is an agreement
of man with man”).
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abuses that in turn lead to disruptions of all societies as violence
spills over borders and refugees flee. 140
B. The Greater the Harm, the Greater the Argument for Holding
Parents Liable: How Much Harm Should Be Required to Hold
Parent Corporations Liable?
The greater the harm and cost to the individual or
community, the stronger the ethical argument for ensuring the
individuals or communities harmed are entitled to a remedy from
the parent corporation (again, assuming such cannot be had in
the host country), limited liability notwithstanding. The question
arises, then, what should the measurement of harm be in order to
remove the protection of limited liability, given the assumption
that there is economic benefit to limited liability that may also
benefit the community, even if not directly (but sometimes
directly, such as where many in the community are directly
employed). Should all harm, even minor harm satisfy removing
limited liability protection? Should all torts, no matter how
serious, satisfy the removal, or just certain torts?
Allowing individuals to seek remedy from parental
corporations for minor harms might be so onerous for
corporations that it deters them from creating or investing in
subsidiaries in host countries that could benefit from the
enterprise’s presence. However, where the harm caused by a
subsidiary’s operations is significant, it is more likely to outweigh
whatever economic benefits may flow to local communities.
Drawing lines for such liability is not an easy task, but
policymakers do make these choices and draw these lines
routinely (and so do judges). One line that might serve well for
determining when parent corporations should be held liable for
140. See Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner’s Programme, U.N.
Refugee Agency, Social and Economic Impact on Large Refugee Populations on
Host Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.7 (Jan. 6, 1997) (indicating
the economic, ecological, and social impact refugee influx has on host countries
and the international community’s response); see also Michael J. Matheson, The
Twelfth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law, 161 MIL. L. REV. 181,
188 (1999) (“The breakdown of democratic government and serious human
rights abuses had caused heavy refugee flows into neighboring countries and
threatened other destabilizing effects in the region.”).
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acts of subsidiaries are torts that violate international human
rights law and serious environmental torts (many of which
arguably violate international human rights law). Indeed, as
discussed in more detail below, the U.N. Guiding Principles, in
counseling toward parental liability, restrict such liability to torts
that violate international human rights norms. 141
There is disagreement, of course, over what constitutes an
international human rights norm, especially those norms at the
edges. 142 Typically, however, human rights norms are those found
in customary international law and in those treaties ratified by a
majority of countries. The U.N. Guiding Principles state that
businesses are bound by all human rights norms contained in
what is referred to as the “International Bill of Human Rights”
and “International Labour Organization’s Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.” 143 The
International Bill of Rights includes the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the main treaties through which those norms
have been codified: the “International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights” and the “International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.” 144 The Restatement of the Law
(Third) the Foreign Relations of the United States lists violations
of customary international law norms as including genocide,
slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing the disappearance
of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. 145
Thus, a normative argument can be made that parent
corporations should be responsible for harm caused by
subsidiaries operating abroad that violate international human
rights standards in high-risk countries (those with corrupt or
nonfunctioning judiciaries) where harmed individuals and
141. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 28, at Part II.A.12 (elaborating
on the “responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights”).
142. See Ho, supra note 80, at 123–24 (listing emerging “soft law” norms,
recognizing that they are non-binding on states).
143. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 28, at Part II.A.12.
144. Id.
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST.
1987).
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communities have no recourse to seek remedy against the
subsidiary because of (1) lack of remedial law; (2) underfunding of
subsidiary; 146 or (3) difficulty in determining what entity to sue
due to structural complexities among the enterprise (the latter
being especially problematic where the logo of the parent
corporation appears on equipment, such as what occurred with
Shell in Nigeria). 147
C. Precedent Where Normative Arguments Have Led to Statutory
Enactments
Such normative arguments in other, similar contexts have
resulted in a variety of statutes in the United States that impose
legal standards not out of concern for economics or legal
obligations (or at least not solely), but due to ethical principles. 148
For example, the Leahy Amendment prohibits the sales of arms
to countries that engage in human rights violations; 149 the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act provides criminal penalties for
businesses that engage in corruption, including for subsidiaries’
actions when they engage in bribery and hide it through improper
records and accounting; 150 and the United States provides for
extraterritorial jurisdiction for certain crimes, such as sexual
exploitation of children. 151
146. In fact, it is the undercapitalization of subsidiaries that seems to have
influenced early courts to hold parents liable for the acts of a subsidiary more
than any other factor. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 2, at 214 (noting this
phenomenon among courts in the early twentieth century as they developed
ways in which to hold parents liable, which ultimately became the theory of
piercing the corporate veil).
147. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1659–78
(2013) (discussing corporate parent responsibility for foreign subsidiaries).
148. See infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text (providing examples of
legal standards based on ethical principles).
149. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2012)
(preventing U.S. assistance to nations that have committed a gross human
rights violation); NINA M. SERAFINA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, “LEAHY
LAW” HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ISSUE OVERVIEW
(2014) (providing an in depth analysis of the “Leahy Law” and related policy
concerns).
150. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012)
(prohibiting corrupt practices in foreign trade).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1596 (2012) (granting extraterritorial jurisdiction over
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With regard to business and human rights in particular,
there have been several legislative enactments in recent years to
ensure that companies perform due diligence with regard to their
supply chain or with regard to conflict minerals. 152 This includes
§ 1502 of the Dodd Act, requiring companies to report to the SEC
efforts on due diligence on their supply chain and custody
regarding conflict minerals; 153 a regulation that provides that
those companies who do business in Burma file reports with the
State Department regarding human rights; 154 and California’s
enactment of the Transparency in Supply Chains Act, where
companies have to disclose efforts to ensure the elimination of
human trafficking and slavery in their supply chain. 155 There are
also various bills and legislation pending, including a federal
version of California’s law, entitled the Business Supply Chain
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2014. 156 The
same concerns that have led to such due diligence regarding
supply chains and contractors should also apply to foreign
subsidiaries from which U.S. parents gain enormous benefits.
18 U.S.C. § 1591, which pertains to sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or
coercion); id. § 2423(c) (prohibiting citizens or lawful permanent U.S. residents
from raping, sexually molesting a child, or paying a child for sex while traveling
in another country); id. § 2423(d) (making it a crime to help arrange, induce,
procure, or facilitate the travel of a person who has the intent to engage in illicit
sexual conduct); id. § 2251(c) (making it a crime to produce child pornography in
foreign countries if they import or intend to import child abuse images into the
United States); id. § 2260(a) (same); Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on the
Extraterritorial Sexual Exploitation of Children, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-extraterritorialsexual-exploitation-children (last updated July 6, 2015) (last visited Nov. 12,
2015) (outlining U.S. laws that pertain to the sexual exploitation of children) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. See infra notes 153–156 (providing examples of recent legislative
enactments regarding company supply chains).
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2015) (indicating the specific requirements
for reporting); id. §§ 240, 249b (implementing § 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).
154. See 31 C.F.R. § 537.530 (2015) (outlining State Department reporting
requirements for new investment in Burma).
155. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2015) (requiring certain sellers and
manufacturers to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery and human
trafficking from their direct supply chains).
156. See H.R. 3226, 114th Cong. (2015) (promoting greater transparency and
company disclosures regarding steps taken to identify and address conditions of
forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and child labor within supply chains).
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V. United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights
As mentioned earlier, there is no binding authority as of yet
requiring parent corporations to remedy the harms caused by
their foreign subsidiaries’ violations of human rights norms.
However, there is persuasive legal authority for requirements in
the form of the U.N. Guiding Principles. 157 As discussed herein,
that parent corporations should both engage in human rights due
diligence for their entire business enterprise and provide a
remedy for victims harmed by their subsidiaries’ actions,
especially those operating in high-risk countries where the
victims cannot otherwise obtain a remedy, is supported U.N.
Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. 158 The U.N.’s
Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in
2011, 159 and thus the Guiding Principles should be seen as
persuasive, if not obligatory, to all U.N. Human Rights Council
members. 160 In addition, some of these principles may at some
point find their way into a treaty regarding business and human
rights, 161 thereby becoming obligatory for those countries that
157. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that the
Principles do not create any new international law obligations). The very name
“Guiding Principles” also signals they are not binding.
158. See id. (outlining United Nations principles on business and human
rights).
159. Id.; Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1
(June 16, 2011) (discussing human rights, transnational corporations, and other
business enterprises).
160. The author could not locate any specific authority regarding the legal
effect of U.N. Human Rights Council Resolutions. However, as an analogy, the
U.S. Supreme Court found that the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status issued by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
was persuasive authority for interpreting the term “Refugee” in the U.N.
Refugee Convention. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 (1987) (providing support for the United
Nations handbook on determining refugee status); see also William Thomas
Worster, The Inductive and Deductive Methods in Customary International Law
Analysis: Traditional and Modern Approaches, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 445, 511
(2014) (citing authority that U.N. resolutions are not binding, but can be viewed
as expressions of general principles of law that are obligatory). Although it is
true that resolutions of the United Nations Human Rights Council may not have
the same effect as those of the United Nations General Assembly, such
resolutions likely carry some persuasive, if not obligatory, effect.
161. Such a treaty is being actively discussed and promoted after the United
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ratify it. Even if the United States does not ratify such a treaty, it
is possible that countries where subsidiaries operate will, which
might lead to arguments that parents of such subsidiaries are
thus bound by any treaty. 162 Moreover, the obligations the treaty
contains may at some point “ripen” into customary international
law by which the United States will be bound. 163
The U.N. Guiding Principles are divided into three “pillars”:
(1) the State duty to protect human rights; (2) the corporate
responsibility to protect human rights; and (3) ensuring access to
remedy for victims of human rights abuses. 164 It is important to
Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution in June 2014 to establish a
working group to prepare a treaty imposing international human rights legal
obligations on transnational corporations. See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, ¶ 1 (June 26, 2014) (elaborating on an
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and
other business enterprises with respect to human rights). Many think it is
inevitable. See, e.g., Salil Shetty, Corporations Have Rights. Now We Need a
Global Treaty on Their Responsibilities, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/
jan/21/corporations-abuse-rights-international-law (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
(supporting the development of an international treaty on business and human
rights) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Puvan Selvanathan,
The Business and Human Rights Treaty Debate: Is Now the Time?, THE DUKE
HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER AT THE KENAN INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS 1–3 (2014),
http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/humanrights/files/2014/11/Business-and-HumanRights-Treaty-Is-Now-the-Time.pdf (describing the evolving obligations of
businesses to respect human rights); UN Business & Human Rights Framework:
More Action Required at National and International Level to Stop Human
Rights Abuses by Business, CIDSE (Dec. 2014), http://www.cidse.org/publica
tions/business-and-human-rights/business-and-human-rights-frameworks/un-busi
ness-human-rights-framework-more-action-required-at-national-and-international
-level-to-stop-human-rights-abuses-by-business.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
(noting that “[the] process towards an international legally binding instrument,
if thoughtfully developed, could provide an important additional tool to ensure
that businesses respect human rights”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). In addition, this topic was actively debated at the Third Annual
Forum on Business and Human Rights, December 1–3, 2014, in Geneva,
Switzerland.
162. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (outlining ways customary
international law could potentially bind the United States).
163. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 28 (outlining the currently
nonbinding United Nations principles on business and human rights); see also
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 367, at 4
(1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 846) (explaining that the ATS “should
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may
ripen in the future into rules of customary international law”).
164. See generally U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 28 (outlining United
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note that the Guiding Principles, which outline obligations of
both States and businesses, apply “to all business enterprises,
both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector,
location, ownership and structure.” 165
Pillar Two, which addresses businesses’ responsibility,
primarily discusses businesses’ obligation to engage in human
rights due diligence to ensure all parts of its enterprise are
assessing human rights risks, effectively communicating with
affected populations, and engaging in due diligence disclosures. 166
Principle 14 reiterates the General Principle that the
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights
applies to all enterprises regardless of their size, sector,
operational context, ownership and structure. 167
Although Principle 14 arguably applies primarily to the due
diligence obligations that follow in Principles 17–22, Principle 22
of the second pillar specifically addresses remedies. 168 It states
that where business enterprises identify that they have caused or
contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or
cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes. 169
Its Commentary notes: “Where a business enterprise identifies
such a situation, whether through its human rights due diligence
process or other means, its responsibility to respect human rights
Nations principles on business and human rights).
165. See id. at princs. 17–35 (emphasis added) (offering United Nations
principles on business and human rights).
166. See id. (defining United Nations guiding principles on business and
human rights).
167. See id. at princ. 14 (discussing the responsibility of business enterprises
to respect human rights, regardless of enterprises’ size, sector, operational
context, ownership and structure). Principle 14 does note, however, that the
scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that
responsibility may vary according to these factors and with the severity of the
enterprises’ adverse human rights impacts. Id. The commentary to Principle 14
further acknowledges that how a business enterprise meets its obligations
depends on its size, on the severity of the violation and harm, and the “extent to
which it conducts business through a corporate group or individually.” Id. Yet
the commentary states: “[h]owever, the responsibility to respect human rights
applies fully and equally to all business enterprises.” Id.
168. See id. at princs. 15–25 (defining United Nations guiding principles on
business and human rights).
169. See id. at princ. 22, cmts. (discussing business enterprise remediation
guidelines).
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requires active engagement in remediation, by itself or in
cooperation with other actors.” 170
The Guiding Principles, in the third pillar, also provide that
States should ensure remedies, including judicial remedies, for
their businesses’ human rights violations. 171 Although Principle
25, the first Principle in Pillar Three applies only to States where
abuses occur in their territory or jurisdiction in requiring such to
have effective remedies, 172 other sections of the Principles
arguably apply to States where the parent is located.
Principle 26 of the third pillar—which discusses remedies—
provides that States should take appropriate steps to ensure the
effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing
business-related human rights abuses, including considering
ways to reduce legal, practical, and other relevant barriers that
could lead to a denial of access to remedy. 173 The Commentary to
Principle 26 then notes that “legal barriers that can prevent
legitimate cases involving business-related human rights abuse
from being addressed can arise,” inter alia, (1) by the way in
which legal responsibility is attributed among members of a
corporate group in a way that facilitates the “avoidance of
appropriate accountability;” and (2) where claimants face a denial
of justice in a host State and cannot access home State courts
regardless of the merits of the claim.” 174
When read in totality, it seems apparent that, although
perhaps not clearly stated, the Guiding Principles require that
countries where parents of business enterprises are located, such
as the United States, ensure that victims receive a remedy for
harm caused by any subsidiary of the business enterprise when
170. Id. at princ. 22, cmts.
171. See id. (outlining Pillar Three of the United Nations Guiding
Principles).
172. See id. at princ. 25 (“As part of their duty to protect against businessrelated human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure,
through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that
when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected
have access to effective remedy.”).
173. See id. at princ. 26 (discussing appropriate steps States should take to
ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing
business-related human rights abuses).
174. Id. at princ. 26, cmts. (emphasis added).
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they cannot otherwise obtain a remedy in their own countries. 175
Although such a remedy can include a grievance procedure that
meets certain criteria, the Guiding Principles are clear that a
remedy must also include ultimate resort to a judicial remedy. 176
VI. Approaches to Holding Corporate Parents Liable for Foreign
Subsidiaries’ Human Rights Violations
As discussed in the introduction, scholars and commentators
have advanced primarily three approaches to holding parent
corporations liable for acts of the subsidiaries where victims are
not able to pierce the corporate veil or otherwise establish that
the subsidiary was acting as an agent for the parent. 177 These
approaches include enterprise liability, the due diligence
approach, and the tort-based parental duty-of-care approach. 178
A. Enterprise Liability
One approach is enterprise liability—where an entire
corporate enterprise is liable for harm that any of its subsidiaries
or sibling companies caused. 179 In this paradigm, there is no
limited liability at all for the enterprise and its various
companies, including parent corporations. 180 Notably, some have
simply argued for unlimited liability for all torts based on the fact
that limited liability was never intended to apply to torts. 181 With
175. See id. at princs. 1–31 (outlining guiding principles on business and
human rights).
176. See id. at princ. 29, cmts. (“They should not be used to undermine the
role of legitimate trade unions in addressing labour-related disputes, nor to
preclude access to judicial or other non-judicial grievance mechanisms.”).
177. See infra Parts VI.A–C (discussing the concepts of enterprise liability,
the due diligence approach, and the tort-based parental duty of care).
178. See infra Parts VI.A–C and accompanying text (discussing the concepts
of enterprise liability, the due diligence approach, and the tort-based parental
duty of care).
179. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text (discussing enterprise
liability).
180. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text (discussing arguments
for and against enterprise liability).
181. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 1916–19 (discussing

1820

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015)

unlimited
liability,
all
shareholders,
even
individual
182
shareholders, face liability for a company’s acts. This approach
is distinguished from enterprise liability, where only corporate
shareholders can be liable. 183 Because unlimited liability applies
even to individual shareholders and has no restrictions
whatsoever, it is, in the opinion of the author, simply too unlikely
to gain traction as a policy and is not feasible. Thus, I do not
explore this approach in any detail.
The notion of enterprise liability has been around for some
time. It first began appearing in the literature in the early 1900s,
arising initially as a tort concept that differed from the fault
approach, and not necessarily addressing issues of limited
liability of parent corporations. 184 The term “enterprise liability”
is credited to Albert Ehrenzweig who used it in the book
Negligence Without Fault in 1951. 185
In 1947, there was a substantial scholarly piece by Professor
Adolf Berle, Jr. concerning enterprise liability in which he argued
that creditors ought to be able to recover from any member of a
group of corporations that constituted an “enterprise.” 186 There
enterprise liability theory in light of arguments on whether limited liability or
unlimited liability is the best liability regime for corporations); infra Part IV
(advocating for corporate liability over individual liability).
182. See Leebron, supra note 24, at 1574–78 (considering the effect
unlimited liability would have on shareholders).
183. See Thompson, Unpacking, supra note 24, at 15–16 (explaining that
early enterprise liability assumed limited liability for shareholders).
184. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 255, 273 (1929) (explaining “the ‘costs of affording . . . protection
can be cared for as part of the costs of the enterprise, and more than all . . . the
risk when it results in hurt . . . can best be borne and absorbed’ by the
enterprise.”). For a detailed and helpful description of the early notions of
enterprise liability in tort, see Edmund Ursin, Holmes, Cardozo, and the Legal
Realists: Early Incarnations of Legal Pragmatism and Enterprise Liability, 50
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 537 (2013).
185. ALBERT A. EHRENZEWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (The Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 1951) (currently out of print), reprinted in 54 CAL. L. REV.
1422, 1424–25 (1966). Before 1951, Leon Green was considered to be influential
in the early notions of the theory with regard to tort reform in the 1920s and
30s. See Ursin, supra note 184, at 559, 572–58 (discussing at length Green’s role
in the development of the theory).
186. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 343, 344 (1947) (discussing the theory of enterprise entities and their
liabilities).
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have been a handful articles since—although not all discuss
“enterprise liability” as that term is used in this Article—
concerning whether a victim of a tort can recover from a
subsidiary’s parent. 187
Enterprise liability historically, and typically, requires that
the parent have functional, or behavioral, control over the
subsidiary but perhaps not the same amount of control required
to pierce the corporate veil. 188 This type of enterprise liability—
requiring control—has been the norm thus far in those few
situations where policymakers have codified enterprise liability
and in the rare circumstances where courts have imposed it, 189
and it is the type nearly all scholars who have discussed
enterprise liability advocate. 190 Some statutes and various court
cases have seemingly relied on this type of enterprise liability. 191
Because the courts use control as a factor, it is often difficult
to determine if the court is simply employing a relaxed standard
of piercing the corporate veil or employing enterprise liability. 192
187. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing examples of
articles discussing corporate liabilities); see also Victoria C. Dawson, Who is
Responsible When You Shop Until You Drop?: An Impact on the Use of the
Aggressive Marketing Schemes of “Black Friday” Through Enterprise Liability
Concepts, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 765–66 (2010) (discussing the concept of
enterprise liability); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability
Reexamined, 75 OR. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (1996) (examining the public’s
misconception of the concept of enterprise liability); George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985) (discussing
the concept of enterprise liability).
188. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 245–48 (analyzing enterprise liability
and its focus on control factors, which stem from piercing the corporate veil
theory).
189. See id. at 231–45 (describing specific areas of law where courts have
relied on enterprise liability); Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 26, at
288–91 (explaining that the “piercing the veil jurisprudence” is evolving).
190. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 247, 247 n.320 (noting that “there is
much agreement among commentators that a ‘control’ approach is the preferred
form of liability” and identifying those commentators, including Professor
Blumberg, who advocate control as a factor in enterprise liability).
191. See id. at 231–45 (explaining instances where courts have relied on
enterprise liability); Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 26, 329–39
(analyzing statutory and judicial interpretations of the definition of “control”).
192. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 252–54 (discussing factors used to
determine corporate liability); Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26,
at 329–30 (“In most decisions, however, the attribution to a parent corporation

1822

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015)

In nearly all cases where a court has employed enterprise
liability, the court has found the parent controlled the subsidiary
to some extent. 193 In other instances, courts have found parental
liability under certain statutes to achieve the statute’s regulatory
goals where the statute does not otherwise prohibit it; in these
instances, however, courts simply appear to apply a “looser” test
of piercing of the corporate veil. 194
One of the most recent articles discusses enterprise liability
in the context of the subject here—violations of human rights
norms by subsidiaries operating abroad. 195 In the Comment,
Meredith Dearborn advocates for a second type of enterprise
liability, general enterprise liability, which she terms “true
enterprise liability,” 196 that does not require functional control of
the subsidiary. With this type of enterprise liability, ownership of
subsidiaries in an integrated economic unit could result in
overcoming limited liability of a parent corporation in certain
circumstances. 197 She would allow enterprise liability where
there is an economically integrated enterprise and where there is
a mass tort, a human rights violation, or environmental harm. 198
1. Why Enterprise Liability Is Not the Best Approach
Although enterprise liability could be a viable approach, this
Article does not adopt enterprise liability as a solution for several
or other affiliated corporation of legal consequences arising from the acts of its
subsidiary or affiliate has rested on a court's relaxation of the rigorous
requirements for ‘piercing the corporate veil’ under traditional doctrines of
entity law.”).
193. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 231–45 (explaining recent trends in
court outcomes pertaining to corporate entities).
194. See id. at 234–36 (discussing that courts have imposed broad liability to
corporations under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act because of the Act’s broad legislative purpose); Blumberg,
Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 329–35 (examining instances where
courts have disregarded the corporate form to impose liability).
195. See generally Dearborn, supra note 2.
196. Id. at 247.
197. See id. at 252–54 (explaining that the parent corporation should be
liable for its subsidiaries when the parent has economic control).
198. See id. at 251–52 (arguing that courts should use a two-pronged test for
enterprise liability).
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reasons. First, enterprise liability as typically discussed and
applied requires a showing of functional, or behavioral, control
over the subsidiary. 199 In this way it is not all that different from
piercing the corporate veil. 200 Second, similar to piercing the
corporate veil, requiring control can actually serve as a
disincentive for parents to maintain due diligence over
subsidiaries’ actions—they will want to distance themselves as
much as possible—and any approach should create an incentive
for parent corporations to assess risks and do all in their power to
prevent abuses. 201 Third, given that corporate entities are
complex and that the enterprise maintains control over
documents, being able to determine, let alone establish, control
would prove daunting and simply too burdensome for most
victims. 202 Fourth, there is no consistent definition of how much
control a parent would need to assert over the subsidiary. 203
Finally, this type of enterprise liability does not take into account
those situations where the parent, although not in functional
control of the subsidiary, still financially benefits from the
subsidiary’s actions at the expense of non-consenting victims. 204
Enterprise liability based simply on financial control of
subsidiaries or related companies with no limitations
whatsoever 205—such as requiring that the subsidiary be part of
an integrated business rather than simply an investment;
limiting liability to certain torts; or limiting it to situations where
the victims cannot otherwise obtain a remedy—is also not
feasible. It is simply too broad. This approach would hold parent
199. See id. at 231 (noting that enterprise liability in the United States has
involved control).
200. See id. at 211 (providing that enterprise liability sometimes may
involve horizontal piercing of the corporate veil).
201. See id. at 249 (describing corporate control over subsidiaries and
incentives to prevent harms).
202. See id. at 246–51 (discussing problems with control-based enterprise
liability).
203. See id. at 247–48 (explaining the problems that arise when examining
corporate parent control).
204. See id. at 202 (noting that the purpose of limited liability did not
include involuntary victims of corporate misconduct but victims exist
nonetheless).
205. See id. at 251–53 (describing enterprise liability based simply on
financial benefits and control).
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corporations liable for subsidiaries’ acts regardless of the
situation or location of the subsidiary. 206 In being too broad, it
offers a solution to situations that may not be problematic at all,
such as where victims have the ability to seek redress from the
subsidiary in a court in the host country where the victims live.
In addition, because of its broadness, it is questionable whether
this approach’s benefits outweigh the risks of unanticipated
economic and financial repercussions.
Enterprise liability in the situation Dearborn advocates,
where the subsidiary is part of an integrated business enterprise
(i.e., it exists or was created to further the parent’s business goals
and its business is related to the enterprise’s business), and
where the subsidiary is involved in a mass tort or human rights
violation, is a far better solution for the reasons discussed
above. 207 However, her approach, while sharing characteristics of
the approach this Article advocates, is also too broad. 208 Similar
to the general financial control-based enterprise liability, 209 it is
not limited to situations where the victims cannot otherwise
obtain a remedy from the subsidiary, either due to underfunding
or due to the host country’s ineffectual judiciary. 210
Second, although unrelated to the issue of limited liability
itself, neither her policy recommendations nor the broader
enterprise liability solutions address the more recent limitations
that the Supreme Court imposed in Kiobel. 211 Kiobel is a barrier
to victims who seek a remedy from a corporate parent for
violations by a foreign subsidiary in the host country, given that
such violations would be unlikely to overcome the presumption of
extraterritoriality that Kiobel imposed, unless the victims can
206. Id.
207. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 254–56 (discussing enterprise liability in
mass tort or human rights violation scenarios).
208. See generally id.
209. See Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 300–01
(explaining that courts have adopted enterprise liability when control is
accompanied by other critical factors, including financial interdependence).
210. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 252 (proposing a two-pronged test based
on enterprise economic control and a tort creditor requirement).
211. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)
(concluding that the ATS does not permit claims against corporations for acts
occurring outside the United States without “sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application”).
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establish that decisions, which led to the harm, were made in the
United States. 212 Thus, to overcome Kiobel, any solution will need
to include a statutory enactment providing for extraterritorial
effect.
B. The Due Diligence Approach
The due diligence approach imposes a duty on parent
companies to monitor the activities—especially human rights
activities—of their subsidiaries, consistent with the emerging
notion that parent companies have a due diligence obligation to
ensure that human rights are complied with within their sphere
of influence. 213 Some scholars and advocates have begun to argue
for this approach, 214 and I suggested such an approach in a recent
Article discussing approaches to overcoming barriers to accessing
justice for U.S. corporation subsidiaries’ extraterritorial human
rights abuses. 215 As discussed above, the U.N. Guiding Principles
also devote substantial space to companies’ due diligence
212. See id. at 1677–78 (Breyer, J., concurring) (analyzing the corporation’s
contact in the United States as consisting of an office in New York, owned by an
affiliate company, and merely being alleged to help the wrongdoers and
agreeing with the majority that holding the corporation liable would be “too
much”). There has been a very recent court decision allowing cases under the
ATS to proceed based on amended complaints, citing substantial allegations of
funding and decision-making in the United States by a U.S. corporation. See
generally Doe v. Exxon, Order, Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-cv-1357
(D.D.C. July 6, 2015), ECF No. 512. For a list of the few cases the courts have
thus far allowed to proceed under Kiobel, usually because of some activity in the
United States, and a list of the numerous cases that the courts have dismissed
in light of Kiobel, as of December 2014, see Skinner, supra note 18, at 199–200.
213. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 28, at 17–24 (outlining United
Nations principles on business and human rights); see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text (discussing corporate liability and the Alien Tort Statute);
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, ANITA RAMASASTRY, MARK B. TAYLOR & ROBERT C.
THOMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE: THE ROLE OF STATES 7–8 (2012),
http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-TheRole-of-States.pdf (explaining that corporations should use human rights due
diligence to address risks and that States should regulate corporations to ensure
they conduct human rights due diligence).
214. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (providing sources
discussing international accountability).
215. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 260–61 (arguing for adoption of
enterprise liability in the United States when corporations have engaged in
human rights abuses abroad).
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obligations of their subsidiaries and related companies. 216 The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises also advocates
for this approach. 217
1. France and Switzerland Are Moving Toward Holding Parent
Corporations Liable for the Acts of Their Subsidiaries Where
They Fail to Engage in Due Diligence
At least two countries are already moving in the direction of
creating liability on the part of the parent company or entire
corporate enterprise for subsidiaries’ extraterritorial human
rights abuses in certain situations under a due diligence
approach. 218 For example, as discussed above, a bill has been
introduced in France that would create a presumption of parent
company liability for subsidiaries’ torts abroad that the parent
corporations can overcome if they engage in human rights “due
diligence” regarding acts of those subsidiaries. 219 It is unclear
from the bill, however, exactly what types of actions constitute
due diligence, other than “all necessary and reasonable
measures.” 220
216. See supra Part V (reviewing the United Nation’s approach); U.N.
Guiding Principles, supra note 28, at princs. 17–22 (discussing United Nations
guidelines on business and human rights).
217. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 22 (2011) (stating that the Guidelines “extend to
enterprise groups” and that “[c]ompliance and control systems should extend
where possible to these subsidiaries”).
218. See Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence: Developments in Europe,
CORE (Jan. 2015), http://corporate-responsibility.org/mandatory-human-rightsdue-diligence-developments-in-europe/ [hereinafter CORE] (last visited Nov. 12,
2015) (discussing campaigners in France and Switzerland lobbying to require
corporations to conduct human rights due diligence) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 260–61 (explaining France’s bill). On
March 31, 2015, a version of the bill was approved. CORE, supra note 218. A
provision in the original bill that would have required the company to prove that
it was not in control of the activities of its subsidiaries and subcontractors was
removed from the final text. Id. The law will now apply only to companies
employing more than 5,000 people in France or 10,000 globally. Id.
220. See CORE, supra note 218 (comparing the draft bill and the final bill
and noting the final bill is weaker than the draft bill).
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In addition, on September 1, 2014, the Foreign Affairs
Committee of Switzerland’s Lower Chamber, by motion, called for
Swiss companies operating abroad to institute human rights and
environmental due diligence. 221 The motion required that
Switzerland’s Federal Council “draft a law to implement this
requirement—if possible in the context of the upcoming stock
corporation law reforms.” 222
The Federal Council recommended rejecting the motion on
the grounds that it would require more than the current
European Union regulations, which do not mandate human
rights due diligence, and because it would place Switzerland at a
disadvantage as a business destination. 223 The debate on the
motion in the Lower Chamber was postponed to the 2015 spring
session in Parliament. 224 In March 2015, the Committee’s motion
was narrowly defeated in the Lower Chamber. 225 However, a
coalition in Switzerland is gathering signatures for a referendum
to be submitted that, similar to the French bill, would require
larger companies to engage in due diligence, risk assessment,
development of measures to prevent possible human rights
violations and environmental damages, and comprehensive
reporting on such policies and actions. 226
221. See PUBLIC EYE, BERN DECLARATION & GREENPEACE, BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015), http://publiceye.ch/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Fact
sheet_BusinessHuman-Rights_EN_DEF.pdf [hereinafter BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS] (describing developments in Switzerland to improve in corporate social
responsibility).
222. Id.; see Foreign Affairs Committee Motion 14.367, THE FED. ASSEMBLY–
THE SWISS PARLIAMENT, http://www.parlament.ch/e/suche/pages/geschaefte.
aspx?gesch_id=201436-71 (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (“Mise en oeuvre du
rapport de droit comparé du Conseil fédéral sur la responsabilité des entreprises
en matière de droits humains et d'environnement.”) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review).
223. See BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 221 (describing the
Council’s desire to appease corporations who use Switzerland as a home state).
224. Id.
225. See Press Release, Swiss Coal. for Corp. Justice, Swiss Parliament
Motion for Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Narrowly Turned Down,
Conservative Backlash Blocks Increased Corporate Accountability (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.corporatejustice.ch/media/medialibrary/2015/03/150311_sccj_
press_release_-_swiss_vote_on_mandatory_human_rights_due_diligence.pdf
[hereinafter Swiss Parliament Motion Failed] (explaining that the motion for
increased corporate accountability failed on a re-vote, losing by nine votes).
226. See Press Release, Swiss Coal. of Corp. Justice, Global Business? Global
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The due diligence approach is appealing because it offers
something similar to the status quo of limited liability but
incentivizes parent corporations to monitor closely and work with
subsidiaries to prevent their engaging in or aiding and abetting
human rights violations, rather than incentivizing distance to
prevent an argument for piercing the corporate veil, or for
enterprise liability when such liability depends on control. 227
The due diligence approach would be better than what
currently exists and would be a step in the right direction for the
reasons stated above. 228 The attractiveness of the due diligence
approach also lies in the fact that our society has traditionally
attributed liability based on culpability; when a person or entity
does what is required of them, the law typically absolves them of
liability. 229 Due diligence, then, seems like a potentially feasible
approach from a culpability point of view.
Responsibility (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.corporatejustice.ch/en/media/ (last
visited Nov. 12, 2015) (discussing that sixty-six organizations are collecting
signatures to require Swiss companies to carry out human rights due diligence)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Swiss Coal.
of Corp. Justice, Popular Initiative for Responsible Business (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.corporatejustice.ch/media/medialibrary/2015/01/150119_sccj_-_press
_release__popular_initiative_on_responsible_business.pdf [hereinafter Popular
Initiative for Responsible Business] (describing the Swiss Coalition of Corporate
Justice’s campaign). The Popular Initiative for Responsible Business Press
Release notes that a broad coalition of over 50 civil society organizations decided
together to launch a popular initiative “for responsible business—for the
protection of people and the environment (the responsible business initiative).”
Id. The Coalition notes that at the heart of the initiative is mandatory due
diligence regarding human rights and the environment. Id. It further notes that
due diligence in this context includes a risk assessment, measures to prevent
and eliminate possible human rights violations and environmental damage, as
well as comprehensive reporting on the policies in place and the action taken.
Id. According to its material, the duty to carry out due diligence extends
through all business operations and is based on the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights. Id. Moreover, the scale and complexity of the due
diligence depends on the specific risks of the corporation—small and
medium-sized enterprises will remain largely unaffected by the initiative. Id.
The text of the initiative is currently under review at the Federal Chancellery.
Id.
227. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 261 (explaining that a due diligence
requirement creates an incentive for parent corporations to ensure their
subsidiaries respect human rights).
228. See supra notes 213–217 and accompanying text (describing the due
diligence approach).
229. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 199, §§ 1, 9 at 2–3, 16 (2001)
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2. Limitations of the Due Diligence Approach
The due diligence approach, however, has its limitations.
First, it is unclear what the standards for “due diligence” would
be. 230 For example, France’s legislation would hold “legal
persons,” such as businesses that operate abroad, liable in French
courts for subsidiaries’ and subcontractors’ actions that violate
fundamental rights, unless the business had engaged in actions
to prevent or deter such abuses of which it “could not have been
unaware.” 231 It did not discuss what actions are sufficient.
Second, although this approach would incentivize parent
corporations to monitor closely foreign subsidiaries’ actions, such
parent corporations may simply “go through the motions” and
“check off boxes,” much like they do now with regard to certain
procurement and supply chain regulations, 232 resulting in
unwarranted and unfair limits to remedies. Moreover, providing
(describing tort liability as predominantly fault based); see generally John C.P.
Goldberg, Comment, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL. L. REV. 467 (1965); Alina
Golanski, Paradigm Shifts in Products Liability and Negligence, 71 U. PITT. L.
REV. 673 (2010). Of course, there is not complete agreement on this, and more
recent tort law has recognized apportionment of liability not based on fault but
based on social costs and who can bear the financial burden of remedy. See, e.g.,
Abraham, supra note 105, at 228 (noting the manufacturer has more
accountability and accessibility for accepting and spreading costs of defective
products).
230. See Radu Mares, Responsibility to Respect: Why the Core Company
Should Act When Affiliates Infringe Rights, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS—FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 169, 170
(Radu Mares ed., 2012) (introducing the conceptual and pragmatic questions
that arise when determining a standard for due diligence).
231. See Bill Number 1524, supra note 30, at Title IVB, art. 1386–19
Any legal person will be found responsible, who in the course of his or
her activities with those of his or her subsidiaries or those of his or
her subcontractors, does not demonstrate having taken all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or deter
the occurrence of damages or the risk of damages, in particular those
health-related, environmental or which constitute a violation of
fundamental rights and of which he or she could not have been
unaware of the seriousness prior to the fact.
The provision requiring that the corporation have the burden to demonstrate it
took all measures in its power was removed in the final bill that is pending. See
supra note 219 and accompanying text (evaluating the amendments in the
French bill).
232. Third United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, Geneva,
Switz., Dec. 1–3, 2014 (notes on file with author).
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for parent liability in other situations, such as the solution
recommended in this Article, would have a similar effect—
parents would similarly be incentivized to examine closely
subsidiaries’ actions and reduce risks. 233 But the incentive would
be real—not merely to shift a presumption, but to truly avoid
liability lest having to pay a significant damage award and the
bad publicity that goes along with it. 234
Third, this approach does not fully address the ethical
arguments outlined above as to why parent corporations should
be liable for subsidiaries’ actions in certain situations, such as
where the judiciary is corrupt or non-functioning, or where the
victims cannot obtain a remedy. 235 For example, even where the
parent engages in due diligence—whatever that might end up
being—a subsidiary might still engage in or be involved in human
rights violations and cause harm. 236 The harm—and potentially
great harm—would still exist; the financial benefits the parent
receives from having a subsidiary operate abroad would still
exist; and the inability of the victims to obtain a remedy would
not make any difference. In other words, the parent would still be
benefiting, while externalizing the cost—in these scenarios, often
great cost—to individuals or communities without their
consent. 237 Finally, like with enterprise liability, this approach
does not address the barrier that Kiobel erected. 238

233. See Mares, supra note 230, at 178 (discussing liability arising from the
parent company establishing a subsidiary in a foreign country and leaving “it to
its own devices in an environment riddled with risks of human rights abuses”).
234. See id. at 179 (noting that “only some risks of harm will be relevant,”
such that the core company’s liability will still be limited in some instances,
which will provide incentive for the parent to monitor its subsidiaries).
235. See id. at 176 (introducing the issue of vulnerability of developing
countries in assigning direct liability to parent corporations).
236. See id. at 185 (examining the effects of the employer and contractor
enterprises on parent liability).
237. See id. at 192 (concluding that the standard of due diligence still
presents obstacles to plaintiffs attempting to recover for human rights abuses,
even if the parent corporation was associated with the subsidiary’s conduct).
238. See supra notes 14–18, 211–212 and accompanying text (analyzing the
increased difficulty for plaintiff recovery under Kiobel).
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C. Parent Corporation Duty-of-Care Approach
In another somewhat recent approach, commentators and
some advocates have taken the traditional idea of a parent
corporation being held liable for its own breach of duties owed to
third parties 239 and have argued that such a legal duty is created
where the parent owns, creates, or allows a subsidiary to operate
in a fashion that creates foreseeable harm to non-consenting
third parties. 240
239. As early as 1929, Professors Douglas and Shanks noted that there were
situations where, even though subsidiaries maintained their separateness from
parent corporations, parent corporations were seemingly found liable in tort for
acts of their subsidiaries. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 2, at 205–10
(noting the circumstances under which the parent corporation is traditionally
found liable for its subsidiary’s tortious conduct). However, they closely
reviewed the cases and noted that the liability was either due to the parent’s
direct role in the tort or the subsidiary was acting specifically as an agent for
the parent in carrying out a decision of the parent. See id. (pointing to instances
of the parent’s agency or direct involvement in the subsidiary’s conduct). In
more recent cases, the courts have found that under the “third party” theory, an
action for a breach of a duty of care against a parent company is available only if
the employee can establish that the parent company assumed, either by express
agreement or by implication, the “primary responsibility” for providing safety of
others. See Mendez-Laboy v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted) (ruling that the plaintiff must show the parent or employer
exerted a notable level of control over the factors leading to the injury).
240. See generally Mares, supra note 230 (advocating for a duty-of-care
approach to hold parent corporations liable for the acts they take in creating
subsidiaries in high risk environments). See also Nora Mardirossian, Direct
Parental Negligence Liability: An Expanding Means to Hold Parent Companies
Accountable for the Human Rights Impacts of Their Foreign Subsidiaries 4
(2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607592 (arguing “that parent companies with
high levels of control or supervision of their subsidiaries owe a direct duty of
care to those whose risk of injury is foreseeable” and that “[w]hen these parents
act negligently . . . controlling the actions of their subsidiaries, they should be
held directly liable”); Nicola M.C.P. Jägers & Marie-José van der Heijden,
Corporate Human Rights Violations: The Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the
Netherlands, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 833, 843 (2008) (noting that “plaintiffs in
transnational human rights litigation may rely on . . . direct liability of the
parent for an act or omission by the parent in violation of its duty to exercise
due diligence in the relationship towards the subsidiary”). In this situation, the
parent company’s conduct and omissions defy a domestic liability standard. This
mechanism has some advantages for transnational human rights litigation as it
will encourage, rather than discourage “more active involvement by the parent
company towards its subsidiaries.” See Kirshner, supra note 20, at 279–81
(noting a similar approach). In addition, the possibility of this theory was
discussed at length during several sessions of the Third Annual Forum on
Business and Human Rights. See Third United Nations Forum on Business and
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1. The UK and Canadian Cases Regarding Corporate Parental
Duty of Care
The current, more modern discussion regarding a parent
corporation’s liability under a direct duty-of-care approach for a
subsidiary’s actions is based primarily on two cases: the 2012
United Kingdom case, Chandler v. Cape PLC, 241 and the 2013
Canadian case, Choc v. Hudbay Minerals. 242 Both cases are
significant because for the first time courts in the United
Kingdom and Canada found that apart from piercing the
corporate veil or agency, parent corporations could be directly
liable for their subsidiaries’ actions based on the parent owing its
own “duty of care” to third parties. 243 These cases were discussed
at great length at the United Nations’ Third Annual Forum for
Business and Human Rights in December 2014 as offering a way
forward to hold parent corporations liable when their subsidiaries
cause injury abroad. 244 However, the reality is that, although
these cases are important models when considering whether a
parent is liable for acts of its subsidiaries in certain
circumstances, the decisions do not suggest a duty occurs simply
because a parent creates or purchases a subsidiary and knows it
Human Rights, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 1–3, 2014 (notes on file with author).
241. See Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Eng.)
(determining that a parent company may be held liable for injuries sustained by
employees of a subsidiary if the parent company knew or should have foreseen
that unsafe workplace conditions would cause harm).
242. See Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, ¶ 75 (Can.)
(ruling that the plaintiffs could pursue a claim for direct negligence against the
parent corporation for human rights violations, including murder and rape,
perpetrated against indigenous people at the subsidiary’s mining site in South
America).
243. See id. (noting that it is not plain and obvious that there is no
negligence claim possible against the parent subsidiary, so the claim may
continue to trial); Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Eng.)
(concluding “the law may impose on a parent company responsibility for health
and safety of its subsidiary’s employees”); see also Michael Goldhaber, Corporate
Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 127, 133 (2013) (noting that the UK Court of Appeal
“resoundingly endorsed” parent corporation liability in Chandler).
244. Numerous participants in forums at the Third Annual Forum discussed
these cases and the potential new “duty of care approach.” Third United Nations
Forum on Business and Human Rights, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 1–3, 2014 (notes on
file with author).
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will engage in operations that might pose a risk to third
parties. 245 Something more is required.
Chandler was based on a claim against a UK parent
company for injury (asbestosis contracted as result of exposure to
asbestos dust) suffered by employees of a subsidiary company. 246
In Chandler, the English Court of Appeal held that in
appropriate circumstances, the law may impose on a parent
company a duty of care in relation to the health and safety of
third parties (in that case, of its employees), and that there had
been an assumption of responsibility for the health and safety of
the subsidiary’s employees under the facts of that case. 247
The facts of the case are important in understanding the
assumption of duty. The lower court, whose decision the higher
court affirmed, 248 found that the defendant employed a scientific
officer and a medical officer, who together were responsible for
health and safety of all the employees within the defendant’s
subsidiaries; that the evidence demonstrated it was the
defendant and not the subsidiary companies who “dictated policy
in relation to health and safety” of the employees; that the parent
company
“retained
responsibility
for
ensuring
that
its . . . employees . . . were not exposed to the risk of harm
through exposure to asbestos”; and that the evidence conclusively
showed the defendant retained “overall responsibility.” 249
According to the higher court, a duty could arise on the part
of the parent because of its “superior knowledge about the nature
and management of asbestos risks,” and that “Cape could, and
245. See Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [69] (Eng.) (“A
subsidiary and its company are separate entities. There is no imposition or
assumption of responsibility by reason only that a company is the parent
company of another company.”).
246. See id. ¶¶ 1, 3 (noting the plaintiff contracted asbestosis after working
for the subsidiary loading bricks at the same factory site as the asbestos
production).
247. See id. ¶¶ 62–78 (noting that, given the parent corporation’s “superior
knowledge about the nature and management of asbestos risks, . . . it is
appropriate to find that Cape assumed a duty of care”).
248. See id. ¶ 79 (“Moreover, while I have reached my conclusion in my own
words and following my own route, it turns out that, in all essential respects,
my reasoning follows the analysis of the judge in . . . his judgment.”).
249. See id. ¶ 31 (providing the trial court judge’s reasoning for his
conclusion that “[t]his was no failure in day-to-day management; this was a
systemic failure of which the Defendant was fully aware”).
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did on other matters, give Cape Products instructions as to how it
was to operate with which, so far as we know, it duly
complied.” 250 Thus, the Court of Appeal ruled:
In summary, this case demonstrates that in appropriate
circumstances the law may impose on a parent company
responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s
employees. Those circumstances include a situation where, as
in the present case, (1) the businesses of the parent and
subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent
has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant
aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the
subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent company
knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or
ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees
would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the
employees’ protection. For the purposes of (4) it is not
necessary to show that the parent is in the practice of
intervening in the health and safety policies of the subsidiary.
The court will look at the relationship between the companies
more widely. The court may find that element (4) is
established where the evidence shows that the parent has a
practice of intervening in the trading operations of the
subsidiary, for example production and funding issues. 251

Before Chandler, several other UK plaintiff cases relied on
the same duty-of-care theory, although Chandler was the first
case to accept the theory in the English Court of Appeal. 252 As one
commentator has noted, under this theory, the parent corporation
may be “held liable for harm flowing from its failure to
competently perform the functions it controls, or to give foreign
subsidiaries sound advice on environmental, worker safety, and
human rights policies.” 253 Broadly speaking, the theory is “that
when a parent company is directly involved in its subsidiary’s
operations or exercises de facto control, then it owes a duty of care

250. Id. ¶ 78.
251. Id. ¶ 80 (emphasis added).
252. See Goldhaber, supra note 243, at 130–32 (discussing the success of
precedential cases brought by local inhabitants under English common law
against parent corporations in the English courts for human rights violations by
subsidiary companies in comparison to claims brought under the Alien Torts
Statute in the United States).
253. Id. at 132.
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to . . . anyone affected by the subsidiary’s operations.” 254
However, such theories of liability exist only where there is
“sufficient involvement in, control over and knowledge of the
subsidiary operations by the parent such that there is no reason
why the general principles of duty creation and negligence should
not apply.” 255 In addition, in looking at the elements, it is clear
that, for there to be liability under this theory, the parent must or
should have had superior knowledge of the problem at hand, and
it must have been foreseeable that the subsidiary or third parties
(in this case, employees) would rely on the parent’s superior
knowledge for the protection of the third parties. 256
The significance of Chandler was that the court held that a
parent corporation could be liable for acts of a subsidiary even
where it might not have actual control over the specific operation
at issue. 257 In this way, it was a groundbreaking decision because
it indicates that a parent company may have a duty of care
depending on the particular facts. But it is a limited decision, all
the same.
The 2013 Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Choc
has a similar holding, 258 In Choc, a Canadian Court found that a
Canadian parent company may have owed a direct duty of care to
a Guatemalan indigenous community whose rights were violated
when a subsidiary of the parent company hired security forces to
forcibly evict Mayan community members. 259 The plaintiffs in the
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. Richard Meeran, Litigation of Multinational Corporations: A Critical
Stage in the UK, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 251, 261 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds.,
2000).
256. See Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Eng.)
(discussing parent liability where “the parent has, or ought to have, superior
knowledge” and “the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary
or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge”).
257. See id. ¶ 74 (noting that, while the parent corporation “was not
responsible for the actual implementation of health and safety measures” at the
subsidiary, the case arose from issues of overall omissions of care by the parent
and not from non-compliance with specific health and safety procedures).
258. See Choc v. Hudbay Materials, Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, ¶ 75 (Can.)
(determining that the plaintiffs may pursue a claim of direct negligence against
the parent corporation for human rights abuses that the subsidiary company
committed).
259. See id. ¶¶ 4–7, 75 (ruling that the plaintiffs made a prima facie
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case alleged that the security personnel at Hudbay Mineral’s
former mining project in Guatemala engaged in numerous abuses
including the killing of an outspoken critic, the shooting of
another man, and rape of numerous women during the security
personnel, police, and military’s removal of them from their
ancestral village. 260
Significantly, the court rejected Hudbay Minerals’ argument
that the case should be dismissed because of its limited liability
regarding its Guatemalan subsidiary’s action. 261 Among other
findings, the court found that plaintiffs had properly pled a direct
liability case against Hudbay under local tort law. 262 Specifically,
the court found that the plaintiffs could proceed with their case if
they adequately pled a “novel” duty of care, given that they did
not plead a duty of care already recognized by law. 263 The court
set forth the three elements the plaintiffs would have to plead to
adequately plead such a duty of care:
1. that the harm complained of is a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the alleged breach;
2. that there is sufficient proximity between the parties
that it would not be unjust or unfair to impose a duty of
care on the defendants; and
3. that there exist no policy reasons to negative or
otherwise restrict that duty. 264

The court then applied Canadian law to each of these issues. 265
showing that the parent corporation could owe a duty of care to the native
people victimized by the subsidiary).
260. See id. ¶¶ 4–7 (discussing the basis of the human rights abuses in the
consolidated claims as being various types of gross violations against the Mayan
people).
261. See id. ¶¶ 17–23, 49 (providing that the argument for piercing the
corporate veil should be allowed to proceed to trial because the plaintiffs
sufficiently pled that subsidiary was an agent of Hudbay Minerals).
262. See id. ¶ 54 (stating that the plaintiffs sufficiently pled “all material
facts to establish the constituent elements of their claim of direct negligence
against Hudbay”).
263. See id. ¶¶ 56, 58 (noting that the plaintiffs did not attempt to prove
that the facts of their case fit under a duty of care already established in a
certain category of cases, so it becomes “necessary to apply the test for
establishing a novel duty of care” (citation omitted)).
264. Id. ¶ 57.
265. See id. ¶¶ 65, 70, 75 (concluding that the facts are sufficient to survive
the defendant’s motion to strike).
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Under Canadian law, harm is foreseeable for purposes of
duty if it is foreseeable that harm might occur in a general way
and the type of damage was foreseeable. 266 The court found that
the plaintiffs adequately pleaded foreseeability because they had
pled specifically that Hudbay knew or should have known that
security forces frequently used violence to evict members of the
specific community; that the defendant’s executives knew
violence was used in previous evictions they had requested; that
the executives knew there was a higher risk of extreme violence
against this community; that they knew security personnel was
inadequately trained and possessed illegal firearms; that they
knew rape against women in Guatemala occurred at a high rate;
and that they knew Guatemala’s justice system had serious
problems and the vast majority of violence went unpunished. 267
There were also very similar specific allegations regarding other
incidents as well. 268 Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs had
made very specific allegations about the level of knowledge the
parent corporation and its executives had. 269
Moreover, the court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
pled proximity, which under Canadian law exists if “the
circumstances of the relationship inhering between the plaintiff
and the defendant are of such a nature that the defendant may be
said to be under an obligation to be mindful of the plaintiff’s
legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs.” 270 The court
noted that the plaintiffs pleaded that the parent corporation paid
specific attention to the problems of the land conflict between its
266. See id. ¶ 59 (explaining that the court first must ask whether the harm
was a “reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act”).
267. See id. ¶¶ 60–65 (describing the acts committed by the security forces
during the forceful eviction of the local inhabitants).
268. See id. ¶¶ 63–64
These pleadings make it reasonably foreseeable that requesting the
forced eviction of a community using hundreds of security personnel,
as Hudbay/Skye is alleged to have done, could lead to security
personnel using violence, including raping the plaintiffs . . . [and] that
authorizing the use of force in response to peaceful opposition from
the local community could lead to the security personnel committing
violent acts, including killing . . . and seriously injuring [the victims].
269. See id. ¶ 65 (“The plaintiffs have pleaded facts which, if proven at trial,
could establish that the harm complained of was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendants’ conduct.”).
270. Id. ¶ 66 (citations omitted).
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subsidiary and the Mayan village; that the CEO publicly stated
that the parent did everything in its power to ensure the evictions
were carried out in accordance with human rights; that the
parent made public statements regarding its relationship with
the Mayan villages; that the parent was directly in charge of the
operations; and that it assumed direct control over the security
personnel. 271 Based on all of this, the court found that the
allegations sufficiently alleged proximity. 272 The court also found
there was no obvious policy reason to restrict the duty. 273
Similar to the UK case, this case is significant, but its
application is still fairly limited given the proximity element. 274
In the Choc case, the plaintiffs alleged significant facts
establishing a relationship between the parent and the
community and that the parent had assumed control over
security personnel. 275 Thus, the cases have application and
promise in certain, limited situations, but they do not stand for
the proposition of a general duty of care based on establishing a
subsidiary in a high risk environment.
2. A New, More Expansive Tort-Based Corporate Parental
Duty-of-Care Approach
The scholar that appears to have taken this parental “duty of
care” approach the furthest is Professor Radu Mares of the

271. See id. ¶ 67 (discussing how the parent corporation’s conduct satisfies
factors that indicate a relationship of sufficient proximity with the subsidiary).
272. See id. ¶¶ 69–70 (noting the court determined that “[b]ased on the
plaintiffs’ pleadings, there were numerous expectation and representations on
the part of Hudbay/Skye and the plaintiffs” that showed Hudbay/Skye was
concerned with the rights and interests of the local community).
273. See id. ¶ 74 (“A court should be reluctant to dismiss a claim as
disclosing no reasonable cause of action based on policy reasons at the motion
stage before there is a record on which a court can analyze the strength and
weaknesses of the policy arguments.” (citation omitted)).
274. See id. (emphasizing the proximity issue).
275. See id. ¶ 75 (finding that, based on satisfying the Anns test, plaintiffs
sufficiently pleaded the elements required for a novel duty of care, that
defendants breached that duty of care, that defendants’ breach caused, and that
it was not plain and obvious that the complaint did not disclose a claim in
negligence).
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Netherlands. 276 Professor Mares has suggested holding a
company liable for acts of its subsidiaries based on the behavior
and actions of the parent in creating a subsidiary to operate in a
“high risk” country—one that does not have effective legal
mechanisms. 277 Specifically, he argues that, where a core
company sets up a separate entity for the purpose of making a
profit, the core company should be held responsible for the
subsidiary’s torts under notions of due diligence and that doing so
without due diligence creates an unreasonable risk, which should
be considered an affirmative wrong under the law. 278 His theory
would require core companies to retain some responsibility in
“initial structuring and ongoing oversight.” 279 Mares notes that
the vulnerability of rights holders in less developed countries
justifies a responsibility to act where there are not effective
remedies available. 280 Mares uses classic tort theory to justify his
approach, noting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports
an actor being found negligent where its actions involve “an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the foreseeable
action of a third person.” 281 He notes that such foreseeability
could occur especially with subsidiaries in the extraction
industries in countries where the legal framework is weak. 282 He
276. See generally Mares, supra note 230.
277. See id. at 176–78 (arguing that the core company’s decision to establish
a “separated entity in a dangerous environment (poorly governed developing
country)” and to let “it loose with a certain mandate (profit-making) without any
checks and oversight over subsidiary activities” earns the core company
responsibility under the due diligence standard).
278. See id. at 176–77 (discussing how the parent corporation injures the
subsidiary through its own conduct when it instructs the subsidiary to commit
wrongful actions).
279. See id. at 177 (noting that, under the due diligence approach, a “duly
diligent company would be free to set up subsidiaries but should retain some
responsibility” regarding the original set up, as well as the long-term
supervision of the work).
280. See id. at 180 (explaining that the vulnerability of citizens in
underdeveloped countries is not caused by poverty or the threat of harm by
businesses, but by the lack of effective remedies available).
281. See id. at 181 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1965)) (providing that Section 302 applies to third party conduct, whether
it is negligent or intentional).
282. See id. (discussing an example in the instance of setting up a mining
site, in that the “undeniable fact is that setting up a mining operations does
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notes that the Restatement supports liability for negligent
selection of a contractor which poses foreseeable risks; 283 and that
it supports liability for the company to take “special precautions”
to maintain safety where a contractor for a “peculiar risk of
harm,” i.e., abnormally dangerous activities. 284 He supports such
liability for a subsidiary by analogy. 285 Professor Mares bases his
approach on much of what the Guiding Principles provide for in
terms of due diligence, although he criticizes them for not
drawing more on negligence jurisprudence to make the case for
core and parent company liability in tort for the situation he
describes. 286
3. Limitations of the Tort-Based Corporate Parental Duty-of-Care
Approach
The parental duty-of-care approach is a potential way
forward for victims, and advocates should use this approach in
the appropriate circumstances. Moreover, because this approach
focuses on the parent’s actions rather than the subsidiary’s
actions, it might be able to overcome any barrier that Kiobel
created. But it, too, has its limitations.

create risks of harm for local communities, risks that are more likely and severe
when the legal frameworks are weak”).
283. See id. at 182 (“So an employer can be held liable for the actions of an
independent contractor if the employer was negligent in hiring or retaining that
contractor, if the employer knew, or should have known with reasonable care,
that the contractor was reckless or incompetent.”).
284. See id. at 182–83 (noting that “special precautions” are required when
“an independent contractor poses a peculiar risk of harm,” and that in “tort it
seems that ‘peculiar’ risks arise out of ‘inherently dangerous’ activities” (citation
omitted)).
285. See id. at 189 (describing the best overarching approach to parent
liability as first drawing on the theories of tort using legal analogies to establish
the problem of responsibility, and then allowing “specialized multistakeholder
settings” to thrash out the details of standards such as reasonable care and due
diligence).
286. See id. at 192 (concluding that developing a focused concentration on
negligence jurisprudence would allow the parent company less relief from the
responsibility of its subsidiary’s human rights violations because negligence
jurisprudence recognizes more exceptions to the accepted standard that third
parties are not liable for misconduct).
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First, under the traditional duty-of-care approach, a parent
will be held liable only where it is directly involved in the tort,
where the subsidiary is carrying out the parent company’s
direction as its agent, or where the parent has assumed
responsibility over the event that caused the harm. 287 The
traditional approach does not address a situation in which the
parent creates or purchases a subsidiary in a high-risk
environment, gains benefits from that act, and transfers the risk
to the community. 288
Second, under the more recent duty-of-care theories in the
United Kingdom and Canada, the parent has to have legally
assumed obligations of the subsidiary, typically through its level
of knowledge and involvement or apparent involvement or
responsibility in the subsidiary’s actions. 289 There has to be a fair
amount of knowledge or involvement on the part of the parent for
a direct duty of care to be established, albeit not the amount often
required to pierce the corporate veil. 290 Thus, although this
approach does present a way forward for victims to hold a parent
liable when the parent has some direct knowledge and some level
of involvement, it does not address the problem of victims left
without a remedy where the parent has a more separate
relationship from the subsidiary but still greatly benefits
financially from the fact that it created a subsidiary in a highrisk environment. 291
Third, while Professor Mares’ approach is broader and shares
the principles and philosophy of the solution this Article
287. See supra notes 281–286 and accompanying text (discussing the parent
corporation’s duty of care to subsidiaries when harm is foreseeable).
288. See Mares, supra note 230, at 180 (pinpointing parent liability as being
culpability resulting from the “the autonomy-granting decision after a
subsidiary was set up, respectively the outsourcing to a contractor, with
disregard to the risks of abuse posed in weakly governed host countries”).
289. See supra Part VI.C.1 (comparing Choc and Chandler).
290. See Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, ¶ 45 (Can.)
(discussing the three situations where the corporate veil may be pierced:
“(a) where the corporation is completely dominated and controlled and being
used as a shield for fraud or improper conduct; (b) where the corporation has
acted as the authorized agent of its controllers, corporate or human; and
(c) where a statute or contract requires it” (citations omitted)).
291. See Mares, supra note 230, at 177 (detailing the separation principle as
an obstacle because the parent cannot be directly responsible merely for
outsourcing per se in a developing country).
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advocates, as he recognizes, his tort-based duty-of-care approach
“has an uneasy co-existence with the separation of entities
principle.” 292 He underestimates this “uneasy co-existence” given
how entrenched the notions of limited liability are in the law. 293
In fact, the doctrine exists specifically to limit the liability of
parent companies for actions of their subsidiaries; the principle
recognizes that parents will create subsidiaries often for the very
reason, or at least in part, to limit liability for economic
activity. 294
Although it is possible under tort theory to establish a duty
and breach on the part of the parent for its own actions (or
inactions), Mares also underestimates both the difficulty of
establishing a duty of care for third party actions under
traditional tort law given the traditionally narrow exceptions that
apply for non-liability of third party conduct, and establishing a
breach—that the actor acted in a way that was not in line with
what a reasonable person (or corporation) would do. 295
It is important to note that there has been a more recent
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm that is not discussed in Professor Mares’
article. 296 The Third Restatement’s position is that a duty exists
whenever the actor’s conduct “creates a risk of physical
harm,” without regard to whether the injury or harm that
occurred was foreseeable, 297 although the Restatement continues
292. See id. at 192 (concluding that the responsibility for parent companies
to take action to prevent human rights abuses in subsidiary work abroad is at
tension with the traditional accepted separation of entities principle, which
restricts the piercing of the corporate veil).
293. See Case Comment, F. Corporations: Perpetual Real Estate v.
Michaelson Properties, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286 (1993) (“Courts have
been willing to depart from the principle of the corporation as a separate entity
only under certain circumstances.”).
294. See id. (describing the purposes of limited liability—to stimulate
business investment and protect certain entities from the actions of others).
295. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(“Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform
to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”).
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
(2010).
297. See id. § 7(a) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable
care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”); Mike Steenson,
Minnesota Negligence Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
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to suggest that foreseeability is an element of whether the duty
was breached. 298 But the Third Restatement’s adoption by
individual states is thus far unclear and varied. 299 Moreover, the
law of when and how a duty is created is in flux and appears to be
in turmoil. 300
Examining, then, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the “fact
that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action.” 301 According to the
Restatement, there are four exceptions: (1) a “[s]pecial relation
may exist between the actor and the other, . . . which impose
upon the actor the duty to take affirmative precautions for the
aid or protection of the other;” (2) the “actor may have control of a
third person, or of land or chattels, and be under a duty to
exercise such control;” (3) the “actor’s prior conduct, whether
tortious or innocent, may have created a situation of peril to the
other, as a result of which the actor is under a duty to act to
prevent harm,” and (4) the “actor may have committed himself to
the performance of an undertaking, gratuitously or under
contract, and so may have assumed a duty of reasonable care for
the protection of the other, or even of a third person.”302
Regarding the first exception, special relationships are
specifically set forth in the Second Restatement and include
common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of land open to the
public, and those who take custody of another. 303 The second
exception requires the third party to have control over the actions
Physical and Emotional Harms, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2011)
(explaining the basic elements of a negligence case, specifically the duty of
reasonable care as laid out in Section 7 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM).
298. See Steenson, supra note 297, at 1058 (noting the apparent rejection of
the traditional incorporation of foreseeability into duty determinations in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM).
299. See id. at 1062 (“State encounters with the Third Restatement
approach to negligence cases have varied widely, from open acceptance to tightlipped rejection.”).
300. See generally id.
301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
302. Id. at cmt. a.
303. See id. § 314(A) (providing that these special relations between the
parties may give rise to a duty of care).
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of another; thus, only where the parent corporation has control
over a subsidiary, or the subsidiary is acting as an agent of the
parent, will this exception apply. 304 The fourth exception would
apply only where the parent corporation agreed to take on a
particular task, either overtly or through its conduct. 305 This
latter situation might apply if the victims could establish that the
parent corporation indeed led them to believe it undertook a
responsibility for their protection. 306 The UK and Canadian cases
appear to fall into this exception. 307
The third exception could apply, as it reads, “[i]f the actor
does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it
has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
the risk from taking effect.” 308 In addition, Section 322 of the
Second Restatement might apply, as it reads,
[i]f the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct,
whether tortious or innocent, he has caused such bodily harm
to another as to make him helpless and in danger of further
harm, the actor is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent such further harm. 309

304. See id. §§ 316–20 (stating the duty to control the conduct of third
parties extends to parents in control of their children, masters in control of their
servants, possessors of land or chattels in control of licensees, those in charge of
persons having dangerous propensities, and persons who have been charged
with custody over others).
305. See id. § 323 (noting that a person is liable to render services to another
if physical harm results from his failure to exercise reasonable care, if “(a) his
failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is
suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking”).
306. See id. § 324(A) (describing that a person is liable to render services to
another third-person for harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care, if “(a) his failure increases the risk of harm, or (b) he performs a duty owed
by the other to the third person, or (c) harm is suffered because of reliance”); id.
at cmt. a (“The rule stated in this Section parallels the one stated in § 323, as to
the liability of the actor to the one to whom he has undertaken to render
services. This Section deals with the liability to third persons.”).
307. See supra notes 241–290 and accompanying text (analyzing the liability
of parent corporations to third party human rights abuses in Choc and
Chandler).
308. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
309. Id. § 322.
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There are, however, a few additional problems in pursuing a
tort theory of parental liability. First, in determining whether a
duty exists, the court will also consider public policy, such as the
magnitude of the burden on the defendant in guarding against
injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on the
defendant. 310 In determining such public policy, the purpose of
limited liability will likely be taken into account. 311 In light of
this, recent “third party” cases in other contexts reveal that
courts typically have held that such a duty is created only where
the parent (or subsidiary) exercised control over the event that
caused the harm, such as a safety measure. 312
Second, even if a duty could be determined, one must still
show there was negligence in the breach—whether the
corporation acted in a manner a reasonable corporation would not
have. 313 Courts have historically held that a breach of duty
cannot be found when the defendant has adhered to normal
business practices, 314 and this might be difficult to overcome
where the corporation is simply engaging in the type of activity in
which other corporations engage by creating subsidiaries to
operate abroad. 315
310. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 202 (2015) (“Legal causation in a negligence
action turns on whether a defendant’s conduct should warrant legal liability as
a matter of social policy and common sense.”).
311. See id. § 32 (“Social policy must at some point intervene to delimit
negligence liability even for foreseeable injury.” (citation omitted)).
312. See, e.g., Parham v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 593 F. App’x 258, 261 (5th Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (noting that under Texas tort law, a duty of care for a
negligence claim against a parent or subsidiary can only be established when
the separate entity exercised control over the event that caused the harm); see
also Mendez-Laboy v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting
that under the “third party” theory, an action for breach of duty of care by a
subsidiary against the parent company is available only if the employee can
establish that the parent company assumed, either by express agreement or by
implication, the “primary responsibility” for providing industrial safety in the
subsidiary (citations omitted)).
313. See supra note 295 (stating the standard of the reasonable man).
314. See Texas & Pac. Ry., Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (“What
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be
done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is
complied with or not.” (citation omitted)); Shandrew v. Chi. St. P., M. & O. Ry.
Co., 142 F. 320, 325–26 (8th Cir. 1905) (citing Behymer, 189 U.S. at 470) (noting
that the defendant company’s negligence is determined by comparison to the
conduct of other prudent railway companies).
315. See Mares, supra note 230, at 178 (elaborating on the various types of
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Third, in using a tort-based approach, potential victims face
additional hurdles, such as choice-of-law analysis and varying
time restraints pursuant to the statute of limitations. 316 It is
unclear what law would apply to such tort claims under a choice
of law analysis. If the claim was that the parent acted negligently
in creating the subsidiary, there is theoretically no reason that
the tort law of the U.S. state where such decisions were made
should apply; if the claim concerned appropriate supervision and
due diligence, it is likely that the law of the country where the
subsidiary is located would apply. 317 It is often difficult to
determine the law of the foreign jurisdiction, and the local law
may limit or not even recognize such novel claims, the elements
for its torts may be more difficult to prove, or may provide for
immunity that might not apply under the forum state’s common
law. 318 For example, a court in the Netherlands recently ruled
that under Nigerian law, a parent company has no obligation to
prevent its subsidiary from harming third parties. 319 There is also
the likelihood that the claim would be dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds. 320 Moreover, the few negligence-based claims
conduct for which core corporations are liable abroad, including the “risks for
driving, of medical care, of handling weapons, of manufacturing goods”).
316. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 201, 226–27 (noting that each state has
its own choice-of-law analysis that it performs before applying substantive law).
317. See id. (explaining that frequently, the court will apply the substantive
law of the state in which the injury occurred, which presumably involved a
location of operation for the subsidiary).
318. See id. at 227 (“Choice of law analysis may therefore create unforeseen
barriers to recovery, especially if foreign law is chosen as the substantive law.”).
319. See Geert van Calster, No Big Surprises in Dutch Shell Nigeria/Royal
Dutch Shell Ruling, GAVC LAW (Jan. 31, 2013, 8:25 AM), http://gavclaw.
com/2013/01/31/no-big-surprises-in-dutch-shell-nigeria-royal-dutch-shell-ruling/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (reporting on the Dutch court ruling that Nigerian
law applied in the suit brought by a Dutch environment NGO against Shell
corporation and other similar holding companies for environmental damages
sustained in Nigeria) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Press Release, de Rechtspraak (Netherlands Judiciary), Dutch Judgments
on Liability Shell (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/
Rechtbanken/DenHaag/Nieuws/Documents/Persbericht_Shell_UK.pdf (stating
that the district court dismissed all claims against the core companies and ruled
under Nigerian law a parent company is not responsible for preventing its
subsidiaries from perpetrating harms against third parties abroad).
320. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 207 (discussing at length cases where
state courts have routinely dismissed tort actions under forum non conveniens
where the harm occurred abroad); see also Hoffman & Stevens, supra note 18, at
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against parent companies for actions of subsidiaries abroad have
thus far been dismissed because courts have demurred in taking
jurisdiction over claims based on foreign tort law due to the
complex and novel tort claims associated with such actions. 321
Fourth, both accessing and proving the facts necessary to
establish a duty of care or a breach may be very difficult,
especially given that the corporation will have control over the
information. The factual pattern required to establish both a duty
and breach will be unique and thus limited. Only in those unique
situations where plaintiffs can establish a duty of care or breach
will there be recovery. The theory does not provide for those
many other situations where the parent enjoys the immense
financial benefits at the expense of the local population.
Even though legal duties of parent corporations might not
naturally arise in tort under most states’ laws in the United
States, the reasons behind the tort-based parental duty-of-care
approach supports enactment of statutory duties and liability in
certain situations to ensure that victims of business’
human-rights violations are not left remediless.

17–20 (“These state-to-state differences may lead plaintiffs to an analysis of the
most favorable procedural forum for a human rights case. Because defendants
will engage in the same analysis, personal jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens motions will likely be the initial battleground in state court human
rights cases.”).
321. See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008)
(affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for intentional torts and negligence
because “Alabama law does not apply to injuries that occurred outside the
state”); In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1355–56 (S.D. Fl.
2011) (dismissing negligence claims the plaintiffs brought under various U.S.
state law due to the extraterritorial nature of the conduct at issue); Roe v.
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1024 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (dismissing state
law claims because “[p]laintiffs have not yet articulated a viable basis for
applying California law or Indiana law to the management of a Plantation in
Liberia”).
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VII. Recommended Approach to Overcoming Limited Liability of
Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Human
Rights Violations
A. Statutory Enactment Providing for Corporate Parental
Liability for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of Human Rights
Norms in “At-Risk” Countries Where Victims Cannot Otherwise
Obtain a Remedy
In situations where parent corporations enjoy numerous
benefits such as shareholder payouts and tax benefits from their
subsidiaries’ activities, while at the same time externalizing
environmental and human rights costs, a strong ethical argument
can be made that parent corporations should ensure that victims
harmed by their subsidiaries’ violations of human rights norms
and serious environmental damage are provided a remedy. Where
an adequate remedy cannot be obtained in the host country or
against the subsidiary, the parent should not be able to raise the
shield of limited liability, especially when it knew the subsidiary
was operating in a high-risk country where a remedy for such
serious harms would be difficult or impossible to obtain. 322
Moreover, as already discussed, for current customary
international law claims brought under the ATS, the
presumption against extraterritoriality set forth in Kiobel needs
to be overcome, even where victims could otherwise bring claims
or seek remedies from parent corporations for extraterritorial
harm, such as through veil-piercing. 323 A statutory enactment of
the type advocated here would avoid the Kiobel problem.
Enacting a statute allowing victims of serious extraterritorial
torts to disregard limited liability and reach parent corporations
is essentially a cause of action applying to extraterritorial
conduct. Thus, no presumption would be created in the first
place. There is precedent for this—as there are numerous
322. See infra note 325 and accompanying text (defining a “high risk”
country).
323. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)
(“[E]ven where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States,
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”); Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
255 (2010) (articulating the presumption against extraterritorial application of
the Alien Tort Statute).
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examples of Congress clarifying that certain statutes should
apply extraterritorially in certain situations, and Congress could
do the same for serious violations of human rights law. 324
Given the limitations of the enterprise liability, due
diligence, and duty-of-care approaches described above, this
Article takes the position that limited liability of parent
corporations for claims of customary international human rights
violations (such as those brought under the ATS) and serious
environmental torts should be disregarded where a parent
corporation takes a majority interest or creates a subsidiary as
part of unified economic enterprise 325 that operates in a “highrisk host country,” and (a) victims cannot obtain an adequate
judicial remedy for such harms in the country due to such
corruption, lack of a cause of action, or other judicial or lawrelated reasons; 326 (b) victims cannot determine what entity is
responsible and thus what entity to hold accountable, given the
enterprises’ complex corporate structure; or (c) a subsidiary is
underfunded and thus cannot pay any damages resulting from
the violations. A “high-risk host country” is a country that has a
weak, ineffective, or corrupt judicial system. 327
Ideally, this change should be done through a statutory
enactment noting that parent corporations would be liable in the
324. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 255–56 (suggesting a variety of potential
legislative options in order to gain jurisdiction over businesses for human rights
claims); see also Paul Barker, Universal Civil Jurisdiction and the
Extraterritorial Reach of the Alien Tort Statute, 20 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 39–40 (2012) (noting that Congress has the ability to specify in
legislation whether it should apply extraterritorially); infra Part VII.C
(discussing extraterritorial enforcement actions against foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations).
325. By this, I mean the business of the subsidiary that the parent
purchases or creates is done to further the business of the parent as part of an
integrated business enterprise, rather than simply a purchase of stock as part of
an investment portfolio where the subsidiary’s business is unrelated to the
parent’s business.
326. This portion of the test has much in common with how one defeats a
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, as well as
exhaustion of remedies in the host country. The similarities are not intentional
but reflect similar notions of fairness when considering whether victims should
be able to seek a remedy in a court outside of the host country, such as the
country where the harm occurred.
327. Whether or not a country is a “high risk” country would be a question of
fact.

1850

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015)

above situations. The underlying claims would continue to be
claims for violations of customary international law under the
ATS, state torts whose facts rise to the level of violations of
customary international law, or serious environmental torts. 328
As mentioned above, a statutory enactment would overcome
the barrier created by Kiobel, given that through such legislation,
Congress or a state legislature would be providing that the cause
of action would apply where the action took place abroad, and
thus, there would be no presumption against extraterritoriality.
In the alternative, courts could incorporate this approach in
“piercing the corporate veil” analyses and when considering
enterprise liability and the tort-based parental duty of care. For
public policy reasons, the Article takes this approach only with
regard to corporate shareholders and not individual shareholders.
This approach has much in common with the financial,
control-based enterprise liability approach, but it is more limited
in its scope and targets the specific problem presented: the lack of
remedy on the part of victims due to ineffectual legal systems. It
also shares a philosophy with the modern duty-of-care approach
but suggests, primarily, a statutory approach to the problem. It
approaches the issue of a parent’s responsibility for a subsidiary’s
actions much the way that the duty-of-care approach does: the
parent should be responsible when it purchases or creates a
subsidiary to operate in a country where it knows or suspects
victims will be unable to seek a remedy for any harm from the
subsidiary, especially where the subsidiary is going to be working
in high-risk industries, such as the extraction or garment
industry. 329
I suggest this particular approach for several reasons. First,
it is broader than the current “piercing the corporate veil”
analysis, the control-based enterprise liability approach, and the
due diligence approach in that the victims do not need to
establish either control or lack of due diligence on the part of the
328. See David D. Christensen, Note, Corporate Liability for Overseas
Human Rights Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219, 1224–27 (2005) (describing the various
interpretations of which causes of action a plaintiff can bring under the ATS).
329. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 197 (noting that almost all states have
adopted some form of a law that “allows plaintiffs access to the assets of a
shareholder . . . to satisfy the debts of a corporation”).
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parent. Rather, this solution provides a remedy for those victims
in situations where parent corporations enjoy benefits of a
subsidiary’s economic activity at the expense of non-consenting
victims, regardless of their actions. In addition, by not requiring
parental control, the approach does not provide a “disincentive”
for the parent corporation to review the activities of the
subsidiary and engage in due diligence. The approach
incentivizes parent corporations to ensure subsidiaries are
complying with human rights norms and obligations.
Second, the statutory approach avoids many of the previously
discussed barriers that victims would face in attempting to
establish parental duty of care and breach through traditional,
tort-based theories. In addition, the statutory approach also
addresses the barrier for extraterritorial violations erected by
Kiobel because a statute would signal the legislative body’s intent
that liability exists for extraterritorial conduct. 330
Third, this approach is narrower than many of the other
approaches because parental liability would apply only to
violations of international human rights norms and serious
environmental torts. Allowing parent corporations to be liable for
general torts would be more difficult to get policymakers and
courts to adopt. 331 In addition, allowing suits for general torts
could create undue hardship and financial repercussions for
parent corporations that are not outweighed by the benefits of
providing a remedy. Moreover, such cases also could
inadvertently limit the direct investment that many of these
countries need to overcome poverty. 332
The test also requires that plaintiffs establish that the
country is “high-risk,” and that the victims cannot otherwise
obtain a remedy due to legal or judicial reasons because they
cannot determine which entity to sue or because the subsidiary is
underfunded. 333 In this way, the solution targets specific,
330. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (discussing Kiobel and
its ramifications for this Article’s approach).
331. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting the entrenched
status of limited liability in the law, which explains courts’ and policymakers’
reluctance to abandon it for general torts).
332. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (pointing to business
investment as one of the purposes of limited liability).
333. See supra notes 326 and accompanying text (defining a “high risk
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problematic circumstances. By being narrower and available only
in situations that are arguably more inequitable, the approach is
more likely to be considered by policymakers and courts.
One might question why it is not sufficient for there to be
underfunding or inability to ascertain the entity for there to be
parental liability without the need to also establish that the host
government has a weak or ineffective judicial system. This is
because, in theory, a country with a functional and effective
judicial system should, and likely will, already provide for
solutions to these problems. Such parental liability for
subsidiaries actions in countries with effective judicial systems
will also likely pose more complex foreign policy and comity
concerns, as discussed in more detail below. 334
Finally, I only advocate for such liability for parent
corporations, not individual investors. An argument could be
made that all investors, individual or otherwise, of a foreign
corporation, should be liable for acts of the foreign corporation
where the corporation, and thus shareholders, benefit at the
expense of non-consenting individuals who have no remedy
available the them. However, the initial policy reasons behind
limited liability—to protect individual shareholders’ assets—do
not apply equally to corporations. In this way, no individual
assets are at risk. In addition, corporations do not act with
moralistic reasons, whereby individuals have the capacity to do
so. 335 Others have articulated reasons why such liability should
not extend to individual investors as it might to corporate
shareholders. 336 Professor Strasser, in particular, has stated the
reasons eloquently. He states:
country” for purposes of this Article).
334. See infra Part VII.D (describing how foreign policy and comity concerns
related to this Article’s approach can be overcome).
335. See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3, 4 (2012) (describing the lack of corporate virtue despite a plethora of
corporate regulations).
336. See Berle, supra note 186, at 347 (discussing “the argument that it
would be inequitable to impose individual liability on associates where they did
not intend to create it and the outsider did not seek to have it”); Dearborn, supra
note 2, at 29, 199, 211, 249, 257 (“[T]he corporation’s personhood is largely
unproblematic when its shareholders are individual investors or corporations
holding minor amounts of stock.”) (internal citations omitted); Strasser, supra
note 99, at 638 (explaining that a parent company as a shareholder plays a
different role than an individual investor shareholder plays).
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While traditional corporate law has not articulated different
rules for a parent company in its role as a shareholder than for
individual investor shareholders, parent companies in fact
present different policy issues and their limited liability
should be determined by a different analysis. The core idea is
that a parent company as a shareholder in its subsidiary
companies is in quite a different economic role and performs
quite a different management function than individual
investor shareholders . . . . A parent company creates, operates
and dissolves subsidiaries primarily as part of a business
strategy in pursuit of the business goals of the larger
enterprise, which the parent and all the subsidiaries are
pursuing together. The parent is not an independent
investor. 337

Moreover, getting a statutory enactment or having a court
find for such liability against individuals would likely be more
difficult to achieve. 338
B. Assigning Liability Without Fault Is Not New
Assigning liability without requiring fault is not new to our
legal system. 339 Our legal system has apportioned liability in
several tort situations regardless of culpability because it
recognizes that in certain situations, individuals and
communities should not have to bear the risk of certain activities
from which corporations benefit. 340 This is seen in doctrines of
product liability—where a business is strictly liable for defective
products, regardless of culpability; 341 where a business is liable
337. Strasser, supra note 99, at 638.
338. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (highlighting another
example of courts’ and policymakers’ reluctance to desert limited liability’s core
purposes).
339. See James Stevens Rogers, Indeterminancy and the Law of Restitution,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1377, 1389 (2011) (noting the prevalence of liability
without fault in the twentieth century).
340. See Abraham, supra note 105, at 195–96 (suggesting that the entity
that stands to benefit from the activity in question should also be the one to
absorb the economic downsides).
341. See id. at 195 (“There is no need for the plaintiff to show that the
manufacturer used inadequate materials, failed to conduct a proper inspection,
or otherwise took a risk whose potential costs were greater than its potential
benefits.”).
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for engaging in particularly abnormally dangerous activities; 342
and where a business is strictly liable for acts of its employees
acting within the scope of employment, alternatively referred to
as vicarious liability and respondeat superior. 343 With regard to
the latter, state courts have notoriously used an extremely broad
definition of “scope of employment,” specifically so that harmed
individuals are more likely to obtain a remedy. 344 In these
situations, courts and policymakers have found it fitting to hold
businesses strictly liable simply as a matter of choice as to who
should bear the costs of business activity. Because businesses
enjoy a profit from this activity, they should be the ones
absorbing the costs, regardless of culpability on the businesses’
part. In this way, our judicial system has chosen to ensure that
costs of doing business are not borne by the public at large. We
can, and should, do the same in situations where parent
corporations derive benefit from acts of subsidiaries acting
abroad in order to ensure that harmed individuals can obtain a
remedy for harm they suffer. Just as within the situations
described above, where the harmed individuals stand to gain
some indirect benefit from the economic activity causing the
harm, this should be the case even where communities might
obtain some benefit from the actions of the subsidiary, such as
jobs, economic enhancement, or products.
C. Examples of Where Congress Has Overcome Limited Liability
by Statute
If Congress or state legislatures are persuaded by the
normative arguments regarding parental corporate liability in
342. See id. (discussing the meaning of “abnormally dangerous” in the
context of product liability).
343. See id. at 182–84 (explaining the elements of respondeat superior and
the scope of its application).
344. See Elizabeth Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day’s Work? Scope of
Employment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation
Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 212 (2008)
(“Use of state respondeat superior law when the United States is being sued,
instead of the individual official, makes some sense, because the aim of
respondeat superior is to offer a deeper pocket to victims injured by
employees.”).
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the situations for which this Article advocates, they could enact
legislation providing for parent corporation liability. There is
precedent for such legislation, at least at the federal level,
especially in the areas of public utilities, financial sectors,
employer-sponsored pension plans, taxes, securities, export
controls, and foreign trade. 345 Such legislation, mostly regulatory
in nature, explicitly overcomes the limited liability of parent
corporations in certain situations; albeit, in nearly all instances,
the statute requires a finding that the parent “controls” the
subsidiary rather than the simple fact that the parent owns the
subsidiary and financially benefits from it. 346 However, the
definition of control varies and does not always track the factors
outlined in various states’ corporate veil piercing doctrines. 347
In at least one instance, “control” can be presumed simply
from a controlling ownership interest in stock. 348 The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 349 notes that when a
company that is part of a multi-employer sponsored retirement
income plan terminates its plan, thus leaving the possibility of
unfunded benefits owed to employees of that single employer, all
businesses that are under “common control” are liable for the
benefits, plus interests, to all the participants in the terminated
plan, regardless of whether any or all related businesses have
345. See, e.g., Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 303
(mentioning that enterprise principles now govern a wide array of industries);
Dearborn, supra note 2, at 240–45 (identifying ERISA, labor law, and bank
holding companies as subject to “explicit statutory enterprise liability”).
346. For a detailed catalogue of legislation and regulations where Congress
has statutorily determined when a parent corporation can be liable for
obligations of subsidiaries, or enterprises liable for actions of its various
businesses, see Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 303–321. As
he notes, however, nearly every one requires that the parent control the
subsidiary. Id. at 304. Dearborn also discusses various instances, including
what she terms the explicit statutory adoption of enterprise law with regard to
employee pension law, labor laws, and financial institutions. Dearborn, supra
note 2, at 240–44. This section of the Article relies on both Dearborn’s and
Blumberg’s work.
347. See Blumberg, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 33–36
(distinguishing between the different definitions of “control” in the context of the
decision-making process of a corporation).
348. See I.R.C. § 1563 (2012) (defining the term “controlled group of
corporations” to mean the group possessing a certain controlling stock
ownership).
349. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1461 (2012).
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corporate form. 350 Importantly, the regulations define “common
control” as businesses connected through ownership of a
controlling interest with a common parent organization; and a
controlling interest is presumed at 80% ownership. 351 In enacting
this section of the statute, Congress essentially “pierced the
corporate veil” for parent corporations owning at least 80% of the
subsidiary, as one court noted. 352
The First Circuit, in reviewing this statute and regulation,
noted that, although state law typically controls when limited
liability can be pierced, state law on piercing does “not constrict a
federal statute regulating interstate commerce for purposes of
effectuating certain social policies.” 353 Thus, Congress can dictate
by statute when parental liability should exist when a subsidiary
has obligations to others, as long as there is a connection to
interstate commerce. 354
Additionally, in the context of financial institution
regulations, for over fifty years the Bank Holding Company
Act 355—which protects creditors and places restrictions on
350. See id. § 1301(b)(1) (“[A]ll employees of trades or businesses (whether or
not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed
by a single employer and all such trades or businesses as a single employer.”).
351. I.R.C. § 1563 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(i)(A) (2012). The 80%
rule is taken from the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, as
ERISA incorporates both. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b)(1), 1302(b)(3) (2012). See also
Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 26, at 313 (noting that the term
“under common control” refers to “ownership of stock possessing at least 80
percent of the combined voting power of all classes of stock . . . or at least 80
percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock.”).
352. This was also noted by the First Circuit in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1093 (1st Cir. 1983). Blumberg, Increasing
Recognition, supra note 26, at 313 (“The regulations utilize the concept of the
‘controlled group of corporations’ as the determining standard for businesses
‘under common control’ and define the term by reference to one of the 80 percent
stock ownership standards of the Internal Revenue Code.”). The same is not true
of single-employer plans; in those instances, courts have found corporate
parents are not liable for subsidiaries’ pension-related liabilities, although, as
Professor Phillip Blumberg has noted, in those situations a few courts have
opined that piercing standards should be relaxed to further the statutory goals
of the statute and plan. Id.
353. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d at 1093.
354. See id. (noting that the congressionally enacted ERISA statute trumped
state law concerns about corporate separateness).
355. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852
(2012).
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mergers and acquisitions—applies to any parent or holding
company that controls another covered corporation. 356 There is a
presumption of control where the parent or holding company
holds 25% of the voting shares of the other corporation and
controls the election of the majority of directors or trustees, or the
company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence
over the management or policies of the bank or company. 357
Perhaps even more significantly, in the context of
extraterritorial acts of subsidiaries, Congress has enacted
statutes that create liability on the part of the parent regardless
of limited liability. 358 For purposes of this Article, the most
applicable is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 359 which
criminalizes the paying of bribes to foreign officials for business
purposes and has accounting and record requirements to prevent
the hiding of bribery payments. 360 The Act applies to all U.S.
“issuers” of securities and “domestic concerns.” 361 An “issuer” is
defined as any company that has securities registered in the
United States or is otherwise required to file periodic reports with
the SEC. 362 “Domestic concerns” is broader, and encompasses any
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States. 363 This also includes any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship with its principal place of
business in the United States or organized under the laws of a
state of the United States or a territory, possession, or
commonwealth of the United States. 364
Although the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA do not
explicitly make a parent corporation liable for violations
356. Id. § 1841(a)(2).
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2012) (specifying which transactions on
foreign securities exchanges are unlawful).
359. Id.
360. See id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (prohibiting foreign trade practices by issuers
and domestic concerns).
361. See id. § 78dd-1(a) (defining issuers); § 78dd-2(a) (defining domestic
concerns).
362. Id. § 78dd-1(a).
363. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
364. Id.
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committed by a foreign subsidiary, the books-and-records
provisions of the FCPA impose an obligation on corporate
parents who are “issuers” to ensure their majority-owned
foreign subsidiaries comply with recordkeeping and internal
controls. 365 Several enforcement actions have occurred against
U.S. corporations under these accounting provisions as applied
to their foreign subsidiaries, including requiring the parent to
pay fines and disgorge profits attributable to the foreign
subsidiaries. 366
Finally, there is also precedent with regard to Congress
providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 367 For example, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act also applies extraterritorially, 368
as does the Civil Rights Act, 369 the Age Discrimination in

365. See id. § 78m(b)(2) (specifying that corporate parents have a duty to
diligently oversee the conduct of their foreign subsidiaries).
366. The most recent case involved the SEC charging Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company with FCPA violations when its subsidiaries paid bribes to land
tire sales in Kenya and Angola. See Press Release, Secs. Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Charges
Goodyear
with
FCPA
Violations
(Feb.
4,
2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-38.html#.VQrP6WR4qY0
(last
visited Nov. 28, 2015) (describing the settlement between Goodyear and the
SEC for Goodyear’s violations of the FCPA) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Senior
Officer of Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Foreign
Bribes (June 29, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/June/07
_crm_474.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (detailing a conspiracy to commit
FCPA violations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press
Release, Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Settles Charges Against Former
Portland Steel Executive for Anti-Bribery Statute Violations (June 29, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20174.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2015) (noting, inter alia, plea agreements for violations of accounting provisions,
as well as other theories holding the foreign subsidiary liable for bribery
payments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law review). For a helpful
discussion of such cases, see The Legal Obligation to Maintain Accurate Books
and Records in U.S. and Non-U.S. Operations, JONES DAY (Mar. 2006),
http://www.jonesday.com/the-legal-obligation-to-maintain-accurate-books-andrecords-in-us-and-non-us-operations-03-14-2006/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
367. See supra Part VII.C (discussing specific examples of the exterritorial
application of U.S. law).
368. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012) (applying to any issuer who, for
example, acts corruptly in furtherance of promise to bribe a foreign official).
369. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012) (applying to employment in a foreign
country).
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Employment Act, 370 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 371
in certain situations. In addition, several criminal statutes apply
to conduct abroad. 372 Moreover, the United States has federal
criminal statutes in the area of human rights that apply
extraterritorially and that can already be invoked against
businesses, namely those regarding genocide, 373 war crimes, 374
torture, 375 and forced recruitment of child soldiers. 376
Corporations themselves cannot be expected to adopt these
principles voluntarily; in fact, doing so might breach their
fiduciary obligation to maximize profit. 377 Thus, any such
requirements should be imposed on them by policymakers. The
best way to incorporate this approach is through statutory
changes. This could occur in a variety of ways. First, Congress
370. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (2012) (applying to practices of foreign
corporations controlled by an American employer).
371. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) (defining employee for the purposes of
employment in a foreign country to include an individual who is a citizen of the
United States).
372. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012) (applying to U.S. citizens or permanent
residents who engage in illicit sex with minors in foreign countries); id. § 2251(c)
(applying to any person who engages in producing child pornography outside of
the United States for eventual consumption in the United States); see also, e.g.,
Maritime Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159(a)–(h)
(1980) (specifying that the Maritime Controlled Substances Act applies to “acts
of possession, manufacture, or distribution committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (2012) (providing for
“extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under” the Biological
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act “committed by or against a national of the United
States”); 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2012) (mandating that members of the military to
who engage in conduct abroad that would be illegal under U.S. law are held
accountable).
373. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2012).
374. Id. § 2441.
375. Id. § 2340A.
376. Id. § 2442. In addition, a pending Senate Bill, the Civilian
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2014, expands federal criminal jurisdiction
over federal contractors and employees who commit certain criminal offenses
abroad including sexual assault and torture. This would end criminal impunity
for federal contractors not employed by the Department of Defense and hold
public employees to the same standard of law as all Americans. S. 2598, 113th
Cong. (2013–2014) (as referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July
14, 2014).
377. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
conflict that corporations may face in maximizing profits at the expense of
others).
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could enact statutes that create liability on the part of parent
corporations, limited liability notwithstanding. A federal
statute could be enacted under the power of the Commerce
Clause that preempts state limited liability incorporation
statutes to ensure liability of U.S. parent corporations in such
circumstances. Second, Congress could amend various statutes,
such as the ATS and the variety of environmental statutes, to
clarify that parent corporations can be liable for the
extraterritorial harms of their subsidiaries.
Similarly, individual U.S. states could amend their
corporate statutes to allow for liability of parent corporations in
such circumstances. 378 In this regard, it is important to recall
that corporations are, after all, creatures of the individual state
and exist with the permission of each state under which they
are incorporated. 379
D. Foreign Policy and Comity Concerns Can Be Overcome
As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, some
might raise foreign policy concerns with this approach, given
that any lawsuit against a corporate parent in the United
States would focus on actions taken by a foreign subsidiary in
a foreign country. 380 For example, the Supreme Court
expressed concerns about whether U.S. courts can adjudicate
cases involving extraterritorial acts of businesses consistent
with notions of comity in Kiobel. 381 Such concerns arguably led
378. It is important to note, however, that if states did so, there could be
arguments of federal preemption if such statutes affect foreign affairs. See
Skinner, supra note 18, at 202 (“Defendants in such claims may argue federal
preemption or argue that the foreign affairs doctrine dictates that federal law
regarding such claims should displace state law.”). However, such claims should
not pose much of a barrier. Id.
379. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing the state as
the source of a corporation’s existence).
380. See supra Part I (highlighting the foreign policy concerns associated
with allowing foreign victims to hold foreign subsidiaries and their corporate
parents liable).
381. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting possible serious foreign policy consequences); id.
at 1671 (stating that adjudicating a claim must be consistent with those
“notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other
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the
Court
to
apply
the
presumption
against
382
extraterritoriality.
However, these concerns can, and should, be overcome. First,
as described above, there are several examples of U.S. laws that
apply extraterritorially, including several that address issues
involving human rights and corruption. 383 Not only did Congress
enact these laws notwithstanding any foreign policy or comity
concerns, it does not appear that any of these laws have led to
serious foreign policy implications. 384 Second, the ATS has been
found to apply extraterritorially for decades without significant
foreign policy consequences. 385 Third, such concerns are difficult
to justify, especially with regard to U.S. businesses and
corporations, given that the U.N. Guiding Principles provide that
nations should ensure their businesses are respecting human
rights abroad and provide remedies for human rights
violations. 386
Finally, there appears to be few serious comity or foreign
policy implications where a parent corporation is simply
providing a remedy to victims in the host country. 387 Even if there
were some slight concerns, such concerns should not displace the
great inequality between parent corporations that benefit from
nations by limiting the reach of its own laws and their enforcement”).
382. See id. at 1669 (“Indeed, far from avoiding diplomatic strife, providing
such a cause of action could have generated it . . . . The presumption against
extraterritoriality guards against our courts triggering such serious foreign
policy consequences, and instead defers such decisions, quite appropriately, to
the political branches.”).
383. See supra notes 367–376 and accompanying text (discussing specific
examples where Congress specified that the statute at issue should be applied
extraterritorially).
384. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 251 (noting the lack of foreign policy
consequences in the aftermath of extraterritorial application of the ATS over
time).
385. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (describing the
modern line of Alien Tort Statute cases).
386. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 164 (“Although other possible remedies
exist, such as internal company grievance mechanisms, international
commitments set forth in documents such as United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights . . . specifically note the importance of victims’
access to effective judicial remedies.”).
387. See id. at 167 (arguing that negative foreign policy consequences did
not result when the United States has historically provided a judicial remedy for
extraterritorial harm).
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subsidiaries’ economic activities abroad and the harm caused to
victims. Moreover, although the claim might focus on the acts of
the subsidiary, the claim would be against a U.S. corporation over
whom the court has clear jurisdiction, as opposed to a claim over
a foreign corporation. How a domestic country governs its own
corporations should be a matter for that country; thus, how the
United States treats its own parent corporations should be a
matter for the United States, and the United States alone.
IX. Conclusion
Some might argue that none of this is necessary; that there
are enough incentives for businesses to engage with stakeholders;
that for corporations to be sustainable, they must respect the
human rights of the community; that the long-term sustainability
of a corporation depends on strong local economies where the
business is located and value exists for all stakeholders, and thus,
trust with employees, community members, and other
stakeholders is crucial; and that long-term success means
respecting human rights. 388
There is undoubtedly truth in these ideas, and they do
provide an incentive for transnational businesses that have longterm growth and value in mind, especially for businesses that
engage directly with local communities, where those communities
know the corporation involved, and the corporation has its
reputation at stake. It is less true for transnational businesses
that have short-term profit in mind, and even less true for
subsidiaries whose reputation is not linked to the parent, or
where the subsidiaries are part of a complex business structure
making it nearly impossible to determine who owns the
subsidiary. In fact, there are instances where it is nearly
impossible to determine who the parent is of a subsidiary causing

388. See Bob Collymore, CEO Safaricom & Paul Buckle, CEO Nestle,
Comments at the Third Annual United Nations Forum on Business and Human
Rights, in Geneva (Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Forum Comments] (notes on
file with the author) (analyzing current incentives for corporations to respect
human rights).
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the damage or engaging in the problematic behavior, often due to
a complex business structure. 389
Whatever the approach, having a clear description of where
and under what circumstances a corporate parent would be liable
for acts of a foreign subsidiary might be a more welcome
approach than one might imagine, given the emerging and recent
UK and Canadian cases for direct liability on the part of the
parent for breach of a duty of care. In fact, a law partner with a
French law firm made comments that some corporations might
welcome a clear approach because such could provide clear
direction as to what is required of them with regard to
subsidiaries. 390 Although there may be a perception that the
suggested statutory approach taken in this Article may not find
many legs in Congress, compelling arguments for such legislative
changes do exist. In addition, given what Congress has already
done with regard to Dodd-Frank and the pending federal
legislation regarding supply chains, getting legislation enacted at
the federal level may not be as difficult as some might suggest.
For example, even those lawmakers who are sympathetic to
corporate interests also want to portray themselves as pro-human
rights. 391 Thus, proposed legislation that is characterized as
pro-human rights may stand a better chance of succeeding than
expected. In addition, some states may be more willing than
Congress to introduce such legislation in an attempt to hold their
corporations responsible, and there are already examples of this,
389. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations:
The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 300, 303 (2001) (noting that “multi-tiered
multinational corporate group[s] function with a parent corporation, sub-holding
companies, and scores or hundreds of subsidiary corporations organized under
the laws of countries around the globe”); see also UN Forum Comments, supra
note 388 (illustrating the complexity of major corporate structures that span
various countries and are composed of multiple subsidiaries, giving the example
of British Petroleum which has sub-holding companies and over 1,200
subsidiaries).
390. See Stephane Brabant, Partner, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP,
Comments at the Third Annual United Nations Forum on Business and Human
Rights (Dec. 2, 2014) (noting that corporations value regulatory clarity in order
for them to understand the contours of what is permissible).
391. See Skinner, supra note 18, at 250 (“For example, according to some
consultees, even those lawmakers who are sympathetic to corporate interests
also want to portray themselves as pro-human rights.”).
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such as with the supply-chain transparency act in California. 392
One might also find more sympathetic state policymakers in
some states than in Congress.
Thus far, policymakers have focused on actions of contractors
and suppliers and are now requiring transparency and reporting
in contracting and supply chains. 393 It is unclear why there has
not been the same sort of focus on these corporations’
subsidiaries’ activities—entities over which they likely can
exercise more control. At a minimum, the same sort of
transparency and reporting should apply to subsidiaries. But
Congress should require even more of parent corporations with
regard to their subsidiaries’ actions, given that the parent
corporations arguably benefit more from their subsidiaries’
economic activity than they do those non-related entities that are
part of their supply chain.
Adopting the approach outlined in this Article is a way
forward to ensure that parent corporations that benefit at the
expense of those harmed by their subsidiaries operating abroad
fairly address such harms. This is especially important for
victims in host countries who cannot otherwise obtain a remedy.
They should be provided a remedy by the entity that can best,
and normatively should, remedy their harm—the parent
corporation.

392. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).
393. See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text (giving examples of
recent legislative enactments focusing attention on company supply chains).

